KANCHANMOY MOJUMDAR

NEPAL AND THE INDIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

FIRMA K. L. MUKHOPADHYAY

CALCUTTA • 1975

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MANU and MITA

ABBREVIATIONS

BPP	*Bengal Past and Present*
CP	Chelmsford Papers
CRP	Curzon Papers
Dept. Notes	Departmental Notes
EC	Political External Collection
Ext.	External
FM	Foreign Miscellaneous Series
FO	Foreign Office
HP	Hardinge papers
HPP	Home Department Political Proceedings
IFP	India Foreign and Political Proceedings
IMP	India Military Proceedings
JARSB	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JIH	*Journal of Indian History*
JRCAS	*Journal of Royal Central Asian Society*
JUSI	*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*
KP	Kitchener Papers
MP	Minto Papers
NP	Napier Papers
NR	Nepal Residency Papers
PEF	Political and Secret External (Subject) Files
PF	Political and Secret External Files
PSL	Political and Secret Library
PSLI	Political and Secret Letters From India
PSM	Political and Secret Department Memoranda
Pt.	Part
RBP	Roberts Papers
Reg. No.	Register Number
Sec.	Secret
WP	White Papers

CONTENTS

ERRATA

p. 5, Para 2, line 4, Foot Note 38 should be o*n Khilafat movement* and *not* on military.

p. 11, Para 2, line 7, *after* of *insert* one

p. 46, Para 1, line 3, *after* of *insert* chandra

p. 52, Para 2, *for* Sub-heading Bir Shamshere, r*ead* Bhim Shamshere

p. 52, Para 5, line 3, *for* Bir, *read* Bhim

p. 69, para 1, line 15, *for* modify, *read* mollify

p. 69, para 2, line 8, *for* claiming, *read* clamouring

p. 71, Para 3, line 13, *after* situation to, *insert* the

p. 77, chapter-heading, *for* The First Phase, *read* The Last phase

p. 92, Para 2, line 8, *for* who, r*ead* was

p. 93, para 4, line 3, *after* status quo *insert* a

PREFACE

Over the years the Government of Nepal has followed a policy with consummate consistency and reasonable success : containing, if not preventing altogether, the impact of political events in India on the course of Nepalese politics—the policy being deemed essential for the maintenance of the political integrity and identity of the country. The policy paid off until the present century when fast-changing developments in Asia tended to break the isolation of the country. Nothing illustrates this better than the impact of the Indian national movement on Nepal. True, the impact was neither immediate nor direct, but in the end it did prove both intense and far reaching. It inspired the forces of modernity and change in the country despite its government's use of all traditional means to check them.

The book has a very limited object : to identify and analyse the policy of the British and Rana governments to tackle the problem created by the Indian national movement and the bearing the policy had on the relations of the two governments. The extent and the nature of the Nepalese involvement in the Indian freedom movement is not treated here ; nor the anti-Rana movement and the part played in it by some nationalist leaders of India. The latter theme has been very ably handled, among others, by Anirudha Gupta, Bhola Chatterjee, Leo Rose, Bhuwanlal Joshi, D. R. Regmi and Balchandra Sharma.

In writing the book I have drawn mostly on unpublished and confidential documents of the Government of India in the Foreign and political Department : I got them from several archives in India and the U. K., where the documents of the post-1913 period were inaccessible to researchers until about a decade ago. They are still so in India, being regarded as classified papers of the "closed period". However, the Government of India relaxed the rule for me, allowing me, access to the

papers of the 1914-1938 period. For this favour I am grateful to the concerned authorities. Full use has also been made of private papers of Viceroys and Secretaries of State, Minister and Envoys who formulated and applied the Nepal policy of the British government.

The book is, so to say, a by-product of the doctoral dissertation I submitted to the University of London in 1968. While working on the theme "Political Relations between India and Nepal, 1877-1923", I came upon a number of documents relating to the Government of Nepal's reaction to the Indian unrest against the British rule in India. I collected a lot more facts when the British government relaxed the fifty-year rule for the study of archival documents.

Nepalese reaction to the Indian national movement constitutes an important dimension in Indo-Nepalese relations to which I have tried to draw attention of the growing fraternity of scholars of Nepalese history. If the book serves as a preliminary account for a more intensive study of the theme, I shall deem my labour amply rewarded.

My student, Shri Umakanta Subudhi, has helped me a lot in writing the book and for this I thank him.

CHAPTER ONE

The First Phase, 1907-1918

Indo-Nepalese relations in the first half of the present century were considerably influenced by the reaction of the Rana government in Nepal[1] to the unrest in India against British rule and the British view of that reaction. The reaction was best seen in the ready involvement of the Rana government in Britain's imperial problems and its willing assumption of obligations for the maintenance of Britain's imperial interests. This was but natural, for the intimate relations with the British government was the main plank of the Rana state policy ; also the indispensable source of its strength.[2]

The Indian nationalist movement had an impact on Nepal's internal politics as well. It influenced the slow growth of social and political consciousness in Nepal, and this was manifested in attempts at institutional changes. Such changes were incompatible with Rana and British interests alike and, hence, their concerted action to frustrate the attempts. The Ranas' was a military state with power securely concentrated in a family which was determined to maintain a society, extremely backward, an economy sterile and a people tradition-bound, ignorant and poor.[3] As for the British, a dependent and obliging family oligarchy was the best political system they could have in Nepal —a state militarily strong, commanding the most exposed section of the Indian frontier and dominating all the military and civil routes in northern India.[4] The many internal and external problems of the Government of India underscored the need for supporting the Rana regime in Nepal.

Anti-British intrigues among the Gurkhas

What worried the Rana and the British governments most was their fear that the anti-British spirit in India might spread

to the Gurkha regiments in the Indian army,[5] undermining their loyalty to the British and causing difficulties in their recruitment in Nepal. Besides being regarded by the highest military authorities as the best element in the Indian army,[6] the Gurkhas were highly valued as an indispensable counterpoise to other ranks in the Indian army and as a safety-valve in the event of any disaffection in the latter.[7] Lord Kitchener,[7a] for instance, found the Gurkhas possessing for purposes of internal defence

> a value which is not shared by any class serving in our ranks. Their interests are irrevocably bound up with ours and in no circumstances could they profit by even a successful rising against British rule.[7b]

Besides, unlike other regiments, the expansion of Gurkha corps was economical, for it did not involve any corresponding addition to the European contingents in the Indian army to maintain balance with the Indian ranks.[8] Hence, while on occasions, for reasons of economy, recruitment of other martial tribes had been restricted, no such measure was taken in regard to the Gurkha corps.[9]

For the Ranas, the supply of Gurkhas to the British Indian army was an act of policy. The martial tribesmen of Nepal,[10] regularly siphoned off, facilitated the maintenance of internal security by releasing the pressure that could otherwise have been generated on the government by these men for whom the Ranas could provide no adequate employment at home.[11] The scarcity of arable lands in Nepalese hill districts, where the martial tribesmen came from, made the problem all the more acute. Besides, the pensions paid by the British government in India to retired Gurkha soldiers provided sustenance to the Nepalese economy,[12] and the military training of these men in India was gainfully utilised by the Rana government to increase the efficiency of the Nepalese state army. Above all, the British need for Gurkhas gave the Ranas a leverage to wring political concessions and personal favours. The British, for instance, had to concede the Rana demand for arms and ammunition to make good the

loss of Nepal's military strength on account of the loss of her martial population.[13]

The apprehension that any political change at Kathmandu might affect the Gurkha recruitment for the Indian army was the most important reason why the British supported the Rana regime. In fact, the Gurkha recruitment was the very basis of the British government's policy in Nepal. No wonder, the two governments were determined to keep the Gurkhas away from the influence of the Indian political unrest ; and the reported infiltration of anti-British spirit in some regiments of the Indian army[14] reinforced this determination.

Attempts at tampering with the Gurkha regiments were first made in 1907 when Bengal was astir with terrorism and the Government seriously concerned over the spread of seditious feelings in the army based in north India and the Punjab. In May 1907 the Calcutta police reported that one Prithiman Thapa, a dismissed Gurkha soldier, having links with terrorists in Bengal, had addressed meetings and raised subscriptions to support a newspaper, the ostensible object of which was to foster among the Gurkhas in India[15] love for their motherland. The paper would also enlighten the Gurkhas about the economic condition of India and promote better understanding between them and the Bengalis. Prithiman sought the assistance of Colonel Bahadur Jang, Nepal's political representative in Calcutta,[16] to obtain the Nepalese government's support for the *Swadeshi* movement.[17] He also vainly wrote to Chandra Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana, the Prime Minister of Nepal,[18] for financial assistance to his paper. The paper, *Gorkha Sathi*, soon took up a critical attitude towards the anglophile Rana regime which led the Government of India to ban its circulation in the Gurkha ranks. But then, Chandra Shamsher's request to Calcutta for the extradition of Prithiman to Nepal was not entertained, for non-extradition of political offenders to Kathmandu constituted the general British policy.[19] The publication of the paper soon stopped on account of financial difficulties.[20]

The Bengal terrorists had set an eye on Nepal. In 1907-08

Chadnra Shamsher received several anonymous letters warning him of Britain's imperialistic designs on Nepal and urging him to give up his pro-British policy.[20a] A letter addressed to the King of Nepal exhorted him to assert himself and to co-operate with the rulers of Bhutan, Kashmir, Gwalior, Jodhpur, Mysore, Jaipur, Indore and Bharatpur in a scheme to overthrow the British rule.[21]

In the *Bandemataram*[22], a revolutionary newspaper of Calcutta, an article appeared blaming Chandra Shamsher for having taken no progressive measures for the development of his state.[23] This prompted Chandra Shamsher to take precautionary measures. Proclamations were issued warning the people in general and Bengali employees in the Nepalese State service,[24] in particular, against having any connexion with political agitators in India. Indian newspapers, critical of the Ranas and the British, were banned in Nepal and their subscribers in the country strictly watched.[25] Bringing an alien into the country without the authority of the Rana government was declared a criminal offence. Even pilgrims for the *Sivaratri* festival had to leave Nepal as soon as the festival was over.[26] In 1910, Dr. Kartick Prasad, an assistant surgeon in the state hospital, Kathmandu, was dismissed from service for having shown interest in the anti-clerical and egalitarian philosophy of the Arya Samaj,[27] with a prominent leader of which, Bhai Parmanand, he had correspondence.[28]

Chandra Shamsher also allowed four Indian detectives to track down some Bengali revolutionaries reportedly engaged in manufacturing bombs in some remote part of Nepal and in training the local people in their use.[29] The event was significant, for it indicated that political necessity had somewhat tempered the traditional policy of Kathmandu to keep the country concealed from the prying eyes of the officers of the Government of India on the conviction that such concealment was essential for the maintenance of Nepal's security and ndependence.[30]

The First World War and its effects

The exigencies of the first World War and, in its wake, the intensified nationalist agitation increased the British dependence on the Rana government to such an extent as to make New Delhi regard Kathmandu's supply of Gurkhas the very "sheet anchor in times of grave trouble in India".[31] In the war years as many as 55,000 Gurkha recruits were supplied by the Rana government as against an annual average of 1,500 men in the pre-war years.[32] The Gurkhas saw action at Gallipoli, Palestine, Mesopotemia, Egypt and regions around the Caspian Sea. Some of them together with four contingents of the Nepalese State army lent by the Rana government constituted an important element in the wartime internal security arrangements in India.[33] The Gurkhas did garrison duty on the North-West frontier and in the Punjab, then seething with sedition.[34] In 1917 they did valuable service in the campaign against the Mahsud frontier tribesmen.[35] The despatch of Indian troops in large numbers for overseas service and the augmentation of Gurkha regiments in India from twenty to thirty-three were precautionary measures against a sudden uprising by the Indian troops.[36]

The unsettling effect of the third Afghan war[37] and the Khilafat movement on a section of the Indian army aggravated the Government's feeling of "grave uncertainty" regarding its future military[38] position[39] and further increased its dependence on ths Rana government. In June 1920, the army authorities, officers of the Government of India and those of the Punjab and the United Provinces met at a conference with a view to adopting suitable measures to check attempts by Khilafat agitators at sowing seditiun in the Indian troops. "A general feeling of unrest" was noticed in the large Muslim section of the army. In such a situation the Government considered it unsafe to rely too much on Indians and decided to have a larger number of Gurkhas in the Indian army.[40]

Raja Mahendra Pratap's activities

The Indian nationalist movement acquired a new dimension during the war when international powers hostile to Britain took a keen interest in it. Indian revolutionaries and political emigres in Germany, Turkey and Afghanistan served as accomplices in the Turko-German scheme of turning Afghanistan and Nepal into centres of anti-British conspiracies.[41] Raja Mahendra Pratap, "the head of the Provisional Government of India" at Kabul, sent an emissary to Kathmandu, named Kala Singh, a member of the Ghadr party,[42] with a letter from Bethmann Hollwegg, the Chancellor of Germany, exhorting the King of Nepal to rise against the British. Mahendra Pratap in his own letter to Chandra Shamsher urged him to exploit the British difficulties created by the war : political unrest in India, hostility of the frontier tribesmen and Turko-Afghan intrigues at Kabul. An attempt was also made to exploit Nepal's extreme sensitivity to any threat to her independence.[43] Chandra Shamsher was warned that his intimacy with the British would affect the integrity of his state ; British domination over the princely states in India, Egypt and Persia was held out as a warning.

Mahendra Pratap sought to forge a link between Nepal, Germany, Turkey and the anti-British party at Kabul, headed by Prince Nasrullah. He wanted Chandra Shamsher to refrain from assisting the British in the war and to support the Indian nationalist movement instead. He urged :

> Nepal by its situation is like the crown of India and as such it should protect the whole land and should not side with the blood-sucking English, the foes of the holy land and its civilisation.[44]

As an inducement, Chandra Shamsher was promised territorial reward and premiership of the independent Indian Republic to be set up after the British rule had been overthrown.

However, nothing came of this intrigue. Kala Singh saw Chandra Shamsher at Kathmandu but received from him no favourable reaction to Mahendra Pratap's overtures. While

returning from Nepal in the guise of a cloth merchant, he was caught by the British police and later hanged.[45]

Several more such moves were made by Indian nationalists to win over Nepal but none succeeded.[45a] Chandra Shamsher remained firm in his loyalty to the British government. His reaction to Indian nationalism was clear :

> the break of the British raj in India would lead to anarchy and a reign of terror and spell disaster to the future prosperity of India.[46]

Nepal's dependence on the British government was so much that he naturally viewed the political events in India "with more than passing interest".[47] He offered the Indian government assistance to restore law and order and to meet the emergency created by the third Afghan war.[48] He imposed a strict censorship on all mails addressed to and from Nepal and banned all newspapers with anti-British bias.[49]

Japan and Soviet Russia

During the war and after the Government of India was faced with another problem : the growing interest of Japan and Soviet Russia in Nepal and Tibet—countrtes[49a] in which the British were determined to retain their exclusive influence. This interest, viewed in the context of London's increasingly unsatisfactory relations with both Tokyo and Moscow seemed to New Delhi as a bid of the two powers to threaten the British position in the Indian border states. The Russian and Japanese sympathy for the Indian nationalist movement and their encouragement to Indian political expatriates added to the British anxiety.[50] In such circumstances the need was all the more for keeping the Rana government in good humour.

There were reports of Japanese and Russian arms being sent to the Dalai Lama of Tibet via Mongolia[51] at a time when the British government, fearing adverse Nepalese reaction,[52] was unwilling to supply arms to the Lama, despite the need to strengthen him against consistent Chinese pressure.[53] The National Assembly at Lhasa[54] even contemplated sending a

deputation to Japan, seeking assistance in Tibet's resistance to China's attempt to recover her traditional control over the country which she had lost after the revolution in 1911.[55] Japanese and Russian spies were believed to have been operating in Tibet and Nepal in the guise of travellers and *soidisant* students of the Lamaist religion. A Japanese consular office was set up at Chengtu from where to keep watch on developments in Tibet.[56] Tokai Toda, a Japanese, lived long at Lhasa and advised the Dalai Lama on matters relating to foreign affairs.[57]

Japan had by then become "the safe retreat for Indian conspirators in the Far East", some of whom like Kesho Ram Sabarwal, H. L. Gupta and Rash Behari Bose had reportedly been given "some form of Government protection".[68] They founded, with the support of several Japanese officers and intellectuals, the Pan-Asiatic League in Tokyo which launched propaganda against the British rule in India and British policy towards Nepal and Tibet. The League issued pamphlets in English and Chinese condemning the British policy in Tibet and Nepal. It was signed by Mahendra Pratap, Rash Behari Bose, Dr. Okawa, the Director of the Investigation Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway, Toyama Mitsura and Uchida Ryowei. The League's project of holding its third session in 1929 at Kabul, however, did not materialise.[59]

Similar criticisms of British policy towards Nepal and Tibet appeared in the Japanese-controlled press in China. The Japanese object was to stir up Chinese feelings against the British policy in Tibet, which was represented to have been far worse than Tokyo's policy in the Shantung peninsula. China was warned that the British wanted to incorporate in Tibet the Chinese province of Kansu, Kokonor and a part of Szechuan and Yunnan.[60] The British government strongly suspected Japanese instigation behind China's persistent refusal to settle the Tibetan problem on British terms.[61] Ekai Kawaguchi, a Japanese traveller, who had earlier visited Nepal and Tibet,[62] lectured and wrote on Nepal's military power and its

strategic location. During his last visit to Kathmandu he was reported to have asked the Nepalese authorities if they would help the Indian nationalists to achieve their object.[63] The British government even feared that Japan might encourage China to assert her traditional position of suzerainty in Nepal which she had lost soon after the revolution.[64]

The strong Japanese commercial competition was an additional worry for the British government. In short, as the British Minister in Peking expressed it, the Japanese policy assumed very much the form of "a direct challenge" to the entire British position in Asia. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, had, therefore, to reprimand the Japanese Ambassador in London ; Tokyo's interference in Tibetan affairs was the most serious issue,[65] according to Curzon.

Chandra Shamsher kept the Indian government informed of developments in Tibet. From him W.H.J. Wilkinson, the British Envoy to Kathmandu,[66] learned that Mahendra Pratap in his effort to go to Lhasa had reached as far as Chamdo where the local Tibetan authorities had prevented his further advance. From Chamdo he wrote to the Nepalese agent at Lhasa[67] urging that the Nepalese government should take part in the political events in India with a view to furthering the cause of Indian independence. In another letter addressed to the editor of *Gorkha Patra*,[68] Nepal's only newspaper, Mahendra Pratap offered his good offices to get Japanese help for Nepal. He also wrote a series of articles in Indian papers exhorting Nepal to emulate Afghanistan in ramifying its external relations and freeing itself from the British domination.[69] Mahendra Pratap's project was to form a grand anti-British coalition of Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, Afghanistan, China, Japan and Soviet Russia. To interest Chandra Shamsher in the scheme, he was promised Russian military and financial assistance, just as Kabul had secured after its treaty with Soviet Russia in 1921. Mahendra Pratap also tried ta raise funds in the U.S.A. to set up in Nepal the headquarters of a revolutionary party which

would incite an internal revolution in the country to overthrow the Rana regime.[70]

As for soviet Russia, it had reportedly launched upon a a pan-Mongolian movement ; Soviet agents had been sent to Lhasa and Dorjieff, a former confidant and adviser of the Dalai Lama,[71] was suspected to have been closely implicated in Russia's intrigues in Tibet.[72]

Nepal and Japan

The British government knew it that Nepal shared the general Asian admiration for Japan's phenomenal development and the impressive growth of its military power. It was significant that some years ago Chandra Shamsher had sent eight Nepalese youngmen to Japan for technical training on the plea that risks of moral deterioration were far less in an oriental country than in a western one.[73] The increased Japanese influence in China, Nepal's erstwhile suzerain, in the years after the Washington Conference[74] had further enhanced the Japanese stock in Nepal.

The Indian government then took all measures to close Nepal to foreigners and undesirable persons. The traditional Nepalese policy of self-isolation received British support in full measure. The British would not allow Nepal to be "a gigantic Pondicherry or Chandannagore"[75]—an Alsatia of political trouble makers. Chandra Shamsher was given photographs of Mahendra Pratap and warned against Soviet interest in Tibet.[76] The hint obviously was : Tibet under the influence of Communist Russia would create the same political and military problems for Nepal as the Czarist Russia's intrigues with the Dalai Lama had done earlier. Nepal was then afraid that with Russian arms a strong Tibet would assert itself and repudiate its treaty with Nepal which gave the latter many political and commercial privileges in the country.[77]

All these problems during the War and after convinced the British government of the "supreme importance of a friendly

and contented Nepal", for if it were disaffected, "the anarchist movement in India would assume a much more serious aspect"[78] than it had done at the time. The subsequent British policy towards Nepal was based on this conviction.

Chandra Shamsher took full advantage of the British difficulties ; he wrung from them many concessions and favours, several British titles among them.[79] To emphasise Nepal's distinction from Indian feudatory states the status of the British representative at Kathmandu was enhanced : he would be designated Envoy and not Resident as heretofore. An annual subsidy of million rupees was given to Nepal on condition that it should maintain friendly relations with British Government.[80] A treaty followed in 1923, recognising Nepal's internal and external independence and its right to procure arms and ammunition-both important gains for Nepal in view of the British reluctance to concede either, for their fear of losing hold on the state by enabling it to be unmanageably strong.[81] A militarily strong Nepal was now viewed by the British government as an effective counterpoise to Afghanistan and the Pan-Islamic movement in general.[82] The treaty was for the Rana government the realisation of an important desideratum : an insurance against the eventual loss of Nepal's independence as a result of the Rana government's intimacy with the British. In fact however, it did no more than merely satisfy the Rana government's *amour propre*. The treaty made no change in the political status of Nepal : a state free from British interference in its internal affairs, but externally independent only to the extent allowed by the British government, the *de facto* suzerain authority, though not declaredly so. The commercial concessions to Nepal provided in the treaty enabled the Ranas to procure luxury items from abroad.[83]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The Rana rule was established in Nepal in 1846 by Jang Bahadur Rana. It was an absolute autocracy, the Prime Minister being the head of the government. In 1856 Jang Bahadur extracted from the King of Nepal a *sanad* giving him the *de facto* sovereign power in the state with the official title Maharaja. The King was hereafter styled Maharajadhiraja. The Maharaja Prime Minister was the virtual ruler of the country, the King being only a figurehead. Satish Kumar, *Rana Polity in Nepal, Origin and Growth* (New Delhi, 1967), Padma Jang Bahadur Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jang Bahadur Rana of Nepal* (Allahabad, 1909).
2. On the policy of the Rana government towards the British see my book, *Political Relaiions between India and Nepal, 1877-1923* (New Delhi, 1973), pp. 1-18, 266-78.
3. D. R. Regmi, *A Century of Family Autocracy in Nepal* (Varanasi, 1958).
4. Mrs. Margurette Milward, "Nepal, the Land that leads to Paradise" : remark by Louis Dane in East India Association, 7 Feb. 1939, *Asiatic Review*, April 1939, pp. 258-9.
5. The Gurkhas were first recruited in the Indian army in 1815-6 when there was a war between the East India Company and Nepal. See my article, "The Recruitment of Gurkhas in the Indian army, 1814-77", *JUSI*, April- June 1963, pp. 143-53.

   Even earlier the Gurkhas had taken service under foreign rulers for example, there was a Gurkha corps in the Sikh army under Ranjit Singh and another in the army of Shah Shuja, the exiled amir of Afghanistan. The Khan of Khelat had a corps of Gurkha body guards. C. G. Bruce, *Himalayan Wanderer* (London, 1934), p. 200.
6. Roberts Papers : Case No. X20923/R 96/2 : Minutes, Notes etc. 1890-Apr. 1893, Vol. V*I*, Pt. II, p. 543 : On the necessity of improving the fighting qualities of the Native Army, 8 Feb. 1890. Also Lawrence Papers, Vol. 32 : Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Jan. 1867.
7. Sir Henry Fane, Sir Charles Napier, both Commanders-in-Chief in the Indian Army and Sir Henry Lawrence, Resident in Nepal, 1843-46, urged the Government to recruit Gurkhas with this object in view.

   The British policy was to recruit men from the "historically antagonistic" races who "could be pitted one against the other, such as the Sikh, Pathan, Gurkha, Punjabi Muhammadan" etc. White Papers, Vol. 24 : Minutes and Notes, 22 June 1893.

7a. Lord Kitchener was the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army from 1902 to 1909.

7b. Minto Papers, M 836—Record of Lord Kitchener's Administration of the Army in India, 1902-09, p. 302.

8. Dufferin Papers, Vol. 19 (On Microfilm No. 517)—Dufferin to Kimberley, 23 Mar. 1885.

9. Napier Papers, Vol. 5/3 : Memo by Colonel H. Brooke, Asst. Adjutant General, 21 Oct. 1874.

10. The Thakurs, Chettris, Limbus, Magars, Gurungs, Rais, Doras, Sunwars and Ranabhats were regarded as military tribes for recruitment in the Indian army. EC 21-6 : Reg. No. 5449/1940.

11. Brian Hodgson, Resident in Nepal, 1833-43. vigorously advocated the policy of Gurkha recruitment. Apart from weakening Nepal, militarily, it would be a means of wearing out the Gurkhas' deep-seated distrust of the British. Besides, the Gurkhas could be held as a pledge for the Nepalese government's good behaviour during any emergency. Hodgson also pointed out that if the martial tribesmen were drained off the country, the military character of the Nepalese government and its turbulence would also be diminished. He averred : "If we could draw off the surplus soldiery of Nepal into our army, we might do her an immense service, enabling her to adapt her institutions to her circumstances, at the same time that we provided ourselves with the best materials in Asia for making soldiers out of". Hodgson's Memorandum Relative to the Gurkha Army, 14 Feb. 1825 (At this time Hodgson was assistant to Edward Gardner, the Resident), FM, Vol. 125. Hodgson elaborated his ideas about Gurkha recruitment in his Report to Government, Oct. 1832, which is printed in *Selections from the Records of the Government of Bengal*, No. XXVII.

12. In 1935, the British Envoy at Kathmandu reported that every year fifty lakhs of rupees were paid to the Gurkhas in Nepal as their pension and about 125 lakhs to Gurkha soldiers in India as their salary, of which a large amount used to be remitted to their relatives at home. EC 21-10 : Reg. No. 6337/1935.

13. In 1893, the Indian government concluded an agreement with Bir Shamsher, the then Prime Minister, whereby the latter undertook to supply Gurkha recruits and get in exchange arms and ammunition. The agreement, though not embodied in any treaty, was honoured by all later Prime Ministers. But the Indian government did not supply arms and ammunition to the Nepalese government in the quantities it wanted ; and this caused great soreness in the Rana government. See my book, f.n. 2, pp. 46-64, 194-8, 208 et seq.

14. MP, M 995 : Minto to Earl Roberts, 6 June 1907, Minto to Prince of Wales, 29 Aug. 1907. M 836—Kitchener's Administration of the Army, op.cit., pp. 269-74.
15. Apart from the Gurkha regiments, there were many Nepalese domiciled in India who, too, were called Gurkhas in common parlance.
16. Article VIII of the Treaty of Segouli (Dec. 1815 and ratified in Mar. 1816), which ended the Anglo-Nepalese War, provided "that accredited Ministers from each government shall reside in the court of the other".
17. The movement was launched as a protest against the partition of Bengal in 1905. The boycott of British goods, spread of National Education and the use of Indian manufactured goods were the main features of the movement. The partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911.
18. Chandra Shamsher ruled from 1901 to 1929. For his life see Percival Landon, *Nepal* (London, 1928), II. For his relations with the British government see my book, op.cit., pp. 101 et seq.
19. IFP (Ext-Sec), Aug. 1908, Nos. 254-55. The two extradition treaties between India and Nepal (1855 and 1866) did not cover political offence. In a letter (No. 3) of 1834 the Court of Directors had specifically asked the East India Company's government to reject Kathmandu's requests for the surrender of political offenders.
20. PSLI, Vol. 205, Reg. No. 1651/1907. IFP (Ext-Sec), Aug. 1908, Nos. 254-55.

20a. IFP (Ext-B), Aug. 1907, Nos. 346-48.

21. IFP (Ext-Deposit-I), Jan. 1909, No. 40. IFP (Ext-B), Sept. 1907, No 101-09.
22. The paper published from Calcutta voiced the policy and programme of the extremist element in the Indian national movement. Aurobindo Ghosh edited it. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya. *History of the Indian National Congress* (New Delhi, 1969), I, p. 110.
23. IFP (Ext-Sec), Aug. 1908, Nos. 254-55.
24. The Bengalis were employed as teachers, doctors and engineers. J. M. Das. *Banger Bahire Bangali, Uttar Bharat* (Calcutta, 1916), I, pp. 539-42, 550-52.
25. PSLI, Vol. 205, Reg. No. 1651/1907 ; Vol. 242, Reg. No. 1203/1910.
26. NR, No. 845—File No. 4527/1909.
27. The Arya Samaj was a socio-religious reform movement started by Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883) whose motto was "go back to the Vedas". The Arya Samajists believe in one God, decry worship of images, child marriage, restrictions of caste and ban on sea voyage. It encourages female education and remarriage of widows. Conversion

of non-Hindus to Hinduism is one of its programmes to "realise the ideal of unifying India nationally, socially and religiously". The Arya Samaj became in the 19th century a great dynamic force in the Punjab and entire north India. A large number of educational institutions are run by the Samaj. Tara Chand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India* (New Delhi, 1967), II, pp. 421-24.

28. PSLI, Vol. 242, Reg. No. 1203/1910.
29. Ibid., Vol, 231, Reg. No. 1372/1909.
30. In justifying the policy Jang Bahadur had told the Resident :

> "We desire to preserve our independence. We attribute that independence solely to our own peculiar policy (You may call it selfish if you like, but we cannot alter it to please you). We know that you are the stronger power . . . You can force us to change our policy. You can take our country, if it pleases you to do so, but we will make no change in that policy, owing to the strict observance of which, we believe, that we have preserved our independence as a nation to the present time."

Even the British representative was treated as a virtual prisoner, not being allowed either freedom of movement or social relations with any one. The Indian government's pressure on Kathmandu to change the policy proved unavailing. See my book, op.cit., pp. 19-41.

The Ranas believed that "with the opening of the country would come responsibilities, obligations, entanglements, interference and finally domination". R. L. Kennion, (Envoy at Kathmandu, 1920-21), "England and Nepal", *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Jan. 1922, p. 51.

31. CP. Vol. 10—Viceroy to Secretary of State, Telg. 9 May 1919.
32. E. Vansittart, *Gurkhas, Handbook for the Indian Army* (Calcutta, 1915), pp. 174-77. More than two lakhs or 45 per cent of the total adult male population of the martial classes served in the war in combatant units.
33. For Nepal's assistance in the war see my article, "Background to Anglo-Nepalese Treaty, 1923", *JIH*, Dec. 1970, p. 615. Also, M. O. Dwyer, "India's Man Power in the War", *The Army Quarterly*, July 1921, p. 253. W. F. O'Connor, *On the Frontier and Beyond* (London, 1931), pp. 286-89. HP, Vol. 121 : Hardinge to Crewe, 22 Jan. 1915. CP, Vol. 22 : Chelmsford to Chandra, 19 Feb., 18, 28 Jun. 1919. PEF, 3525/1914, Pt. I : Memo on India's contribution to the War, p. 11, C. G. Bruce and W. B. Northey, "Nepal", *Geographical Journal*, Apr. 1925, p. 290.
34. PSL, Vol. D 187 : Memorandum on Nepal and Leading Personages in that country, pp, 5-6. PF, 1920, Vol. 7, Reg. No. 3426/1920.

35. PEF, 1364/1913, pt. 6 deals with the campaign.
36. KP, PRO 30/57, No. 70 : H. Butler to Kitchener, 20 Oct. 1915.
37. The Third Afghan war which broke out in April 1919 set off serious disturbances in the adjacent Pathan territory ; the British lost almost the whole of Waziristan. However, by the use of aeroplanes and bombs, the British soon achieved victory, A treaty of peace was signed in August 1919 which was confirmed by another treaty in November. W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 177, 192-201, 258-59. L. W. Adamec, *Afghanistan* 1900-1923 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 108-23.
38. The movement was a protest against the British role in the dismemberment of Turkey after the First World War and the treatment meted out to its Sultan, the Caliph of the Islamic world. The movement, supported by Gandhi, saw a great fraternisation of the Hindus and Muslims in India. Sitaramayya, op.cit., pp. 189-193.
39. HPP (Confidential), Vol. 64, Sept. 1921, File No. 345.
40. Ibid., Feb. 1921, Nos. 341-54.
41. A Turko-German mission arrived at Kabul in October 1915 and was joined by a number of Indian revolutionaries. The mission tried to incite Amir Habibullah to give up his policy of peace with the British but failed. However, it won over the Amir's mother, brother and a son to the German cause. G. N. Molesworth, *Afghanistan, 1919, An account of operations in the third Afghan War* (Bombay, 1962), p. 21.
42. During the first world war, the Sikhs in America under Har Dayal started a revolutionary organisation, called the Ghadr (Mutiny). The party sent emissaries to many states in East and South East Asia with a view to sowing in the Indian community there anti-British feelings. Har Dayal went to Germany and to Kabul where he made an abortive attempt at inciting a Muslim uprising.
43. Nepal was always fearful of British domination following their relations with the country.
44. PEF, 3443/1916, Pt. 6 : Reg. No. 4450/1917, Mahendra Pratap to Chandra Shamsher, 15 June, 1917.
45. Ibid., Reg. Nos. 2854, 5051/1917, 2750/1918, 3769/1921.

45a. IFP (Int.-Sec.-B), File No. 106-09/1918 ; File No. 47-50/1919.

46. F. O. 766/12 : Copy of a draft of a letter from Chandra Shamsher to Viceroy, 12 May 1919.
47. Ibid.
48. CP, Vol. 22, pp. 204, 219-20. F. O. 766/12 : Chandra to O'Connor, 20 Apr., 2 May 1919. IFP, (Int.-A), File No. 43/1919. Landon, op.cit., 146-7.
49. The papers were *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), *Bengalee* (Calcutta),

Leader (Allahabad), *Hamdard* (Delhi), *Bharat Mitra* (Calcutta), *Bangabasi* (Calcutta), *Jnanmitra* (Bombay), *Oudh Akbar* (Lucknow) and *Zamindar* (Lahore). IFP (Secret-War), May 1915, Nos. 783-86, Dept. Notes.

49a. PEF, 3764/1913 : Reg. No. 2640/1915. PF, 1916, Vol. 6 : Reg. No. 1742/1916. PSM, B 224 : Japanese Policy in its bearing on India, 1916.

50. Ibid., B 268 : Draft of a Memo on the Employment of Japanese troops in Mesopotemia, 1917. PF, 1916, Vol. 6 : Reg. No. 4568/1918 ; 1919, Vol. 5 : Reg. No. 1362/1919. CP. Vol. 17 : H. Butler to Chelmsford, 3 Oct. 1916. IFP (Sec.-Ext.), File Nos. 459 (2)/1923, 37/1926.

51. Ibid., Reg. No. 459/1923. PEF, 876/1920, Pt. 1 : Reg No. 2212/1921. Charles Bell, *Tibet, Past and Present* (Oxford, 1924), p. 221.

52. On account of its traditional hostility towards Tibet, Nepal viewed with concern the British support to the Dalai Lama after the latter had overthrown the Chinese yoke in 1911-12. In 1914 the Indian government had supplied a small quantity of arms to the Dalai Lama and this was grudged by Kathmandu. Hereafter Nepal's reaction formed an important factor in British policy towards Tibet. PSM, B 324 : Tibet, the proposed negotiation, 1917. See also my book, op. cit., pp. 205-08, 217-19.

53. After the revolution in 1911, China lost its traditional control on Tibet. The Tibetan independence which followed was underwritten by the British government which assisted the Dalai Lama to foil the Chinese bid to recover their position in Tibet. E. Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Official in Eastern Tibet* (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 47 et seq ; *Affairs of China* (London, 1938), pp, 225-27. PSM, B 324, op. cit. ; B 344 : Tibet, Question of supply of arms, 1920. Bell, *Tibet*, op. cit., 158-77, 244-70.

However, soon after Charles Bell's mission to Lhasa in 1920, some arms were supplied to the Dalai Lama to keep up British influence in Tibet. PEF, 3260/1917, Pt. 6 : Reg. No. 1460, enclosing Bell's report on his mission. Also, Bell "The Dalai Lama, Lhasa 1921", *JRCAS*, Vol. XI, 1924, pp. 36-50.

54. The assembly consisted of 335 ecclesiastical and lay officials of the government ; it exercised great power, particularly in foreign affairs. C. Bell, *The Portrait of the Dalai Lama* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 144-47.

55. PSM, B 224 : Japanese policy in its bearing on India, 1916.

56. PF, 1916, Vol. 6 : Reg. No. 1742/1916.

57. Tokai Toda was in Lhasa in 1913-23. See his book *The Thirteenth Dalai Lama* (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 87-97.

58. PF, 1919, Vol. 5 : Reg. No. 1362/1919. IFP (Ext. -Sec.), File No. 654/1923.
59. Ibid., File No. 264/1930. PF, 1919, Vol. 5 : Reg. No. 1362/1919.
60. PEF, 3260/1917, Pt. 3 : Reg. Nos. 800, 4656, 5377, 6671/1919.
61. The Tibetan problem originated in Lhasa's resistance to China's bid to restore its lost authority in the country and the British support to Lhasa. In 1914, British pressure obliged the Chinese to attend a tripartite conference at Simla to settle the Tibetan problem. An agreement followed known at the Simla Convention. Although the Chinese representative to the conference initialled the agreement, the Chinese government repudiated it. It did not accept the Sino-Tibetan frontier as determined by the Tibetan and British delegations to the conference ; it did not accept either their plan of dividing Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet, the latter being an autonomous political entity. The post-1914 period saw Sino-Tibetan military confrontation and British diplomatic intervention. Alastair Lamb, *The McMahon Line* (London. 1966), II, pp. 459-566, 620-30. H. E. Richardson, *Tibet and its History* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 107-20. See also references in fn. 53 above.
62. Kawaguchi was a Buddhist scholar ; he went to Nepal and Tibet in 1899-1904 and again in 1913. See his book *Three Years in Tibet* (Benares and London, 1909), pp. 526-29, 685-713.
63. PEF, 3764/1913 ; Reg. No. 4814/1918.
64. China looked upon Nepal as a tributary, Kathmandu having been sending since 1792 tribute-bearing missions to Peking every five years. The last mission went in 1908. Chinese claim of suzerainty in 1906-11 was rejected by Nepal and successfully challenged by the British government who asserted exclusive relations with Kathmandu. See my book, op. cit., 155-75, 182-83.
65. PEF, 3260/1917, Pt. 3 : Reg. Nos. 5191, 6671/1919.
66. In 1920, in deference to Kathmandu's desire, the British Resident was designated Envoy so as to emphasise Nepal's distinction from Indian feudatory states. PEF, 3085/1912, Pt. 1 : Reg. Nos. 3765, 8364/1920.
67. PEF, 4353/1920 : Reg. No. 1640, 2712/1926. After a war between Nepal and Tibet. a treaty of peace was concluded whereby a Nepalese political officer (*Bharadar*) was posted at Lhasa. Earlier a junior officer (*Naikhya*) represented Kathmandu in the Tibetan capital. C. U. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* (Calcutta, 1909). II, p. 97 fn.
68. This government-controlled newspaper was started by Deb Shamsher who was Prime Minister for only three months (March-June

1901). In the 1920s it was edited by Jai Prthvi Bahadur, a son-in-law of Chandra Shamsher. Memorandum on Nepal, 1922, op.cit.

69. PEF, 4353/1920 : Reg. No. 768/1926. The Anglo-Afghan treaty, 1921 ended the erstwhile British control of Afghan foreign relations. Amir Amanullah exchanged missions with Soviet Russia in 1919 ; a treaty was made with it in 1920-21, followed by political and economic agreements with Germany, Italy and France. PSM, A190 : Afghanistan, 1921 ; A 194 : Report on the Kabul Mission by H. R. C. Dobbs, 9 Jan. 1922. P. Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan* (London, 1940), II, pp. 283-94. Adamec, op. cit., pp. 142-48, 162-63, 188-91,
70. PEF, 4353/1920, Pts. 1 and 2 deal with Mahendra Pratap's activities which are also recorded in his autobiography : *My Life-story of Fiftyfive years* (Dehra Dun, 1947), pp. 41 et seq.
71. Dorjieff was the main instrument of the Czar Nicholas II's intrigues with the Dalai Lama which provoked Lord Curzon to despatch the Younghusband mission to Lhasa in 1903-4. Parshotam Mehra, *The Younghusband Mission, An Interpretation* (Bombay, 1968), pp. 125-39, 142-44, 155, 257-59.
72 IFP, (Ext. -Sec.) : File No. 459 (2)/1923 ; File No. 37/1926. Col. F. M. Bailey, Political Officer, Sikkim, was sent to Lhasa in 1924 to foil the Soviet intrigues in Tibet and to keep up the British influence there.
73. IFP (Ext. -B), Apr. 1907, Nos. 78-81.
74. The Washington Conference, 1921-2 had two objects : limitation of naval armaments and settlement of the problems of the Far East created by Japanese ambitions.
75. H. Wilkinson-Guillemard, "Nepal and Her Relation to British Government", *Asiatic Review*, Apr. 1934, p. 274.
76. IFP, (Ext. -Sec.), File No. 37/1926.
77. In 1902-04, Kathmandu feared that Russian alliance would make Tibet strong enough to defy Nepal and to abrogate the treaty of 1856 which had given the latter important political and commercial privileges in Tibet. A weak Tibet enabled Nepal to bully it. Nepal rendered assistance to the Younghusband mission. See my book, op. cit., pp. 101-130.
78. PEF, 3085/1912, Pt. 1 : Reg. No. 5180/1918, Draft Minute, 2612/1919, PF. 1920, Vol. 7 : Reg. No. 3426, Dept. Note. IFP (Int. -Sec), July 1919, Nos. 36-65 : Memorandum on Nepal, by Edwin Montagu.
79. The titles he received were G. C. B., G. C. S. I. G. C. M. G., G.C.V.O., D.C.L. (Oxford). EC, 21-5 : Who is Who in Nepal, 1949.
80. PEF, 3085/1912, Pt. 1 : Reg. Nos. 2612, 5596/1919. CP, Vol. 10 : Chelmsford to Montagu, Telg. 9 May 1919.

81. The British government had always to reckon with Nepal's extreme sensitivity to any impugnation of her independent status and distinction from Indian feudatory states by the Indian government. Even after the treaty of 1923, Nepal's uneasiness in this regard did not cease. In 1934, the British had to concede the Nepalese demand for an accredited representative at the Court of St. James ; and this enhanced the political status of Nepal. See my book, op. cit., pp. 184-234.
82. PEF, 3085/1912, Pt. 1 : Reg. No. 5180/1918. IFP, (Ext. -Sec.), July, 1919, Nos. 36-65, Memorandum by Montagu, op. cit. E. Howell, "Some Problems of the Indian Frontier", *JRCAS*, April 1934, Pt. II, p. 191.
83. See my article, "Background to the Anglo-Nepalese Treaty, 1923", op. cit.

CHAPTER TWO

Growth of Nepali Political Consciousness

Problems created by the World War : *Nepalese migration to India*

The Rana government no doubt cashed in on the British difficulties. But then, the war also left a crop of problems for it, and with the years they grew. The war years and later saw large scale migration of the Nepalese to India causing difficulties in agricultural operations in Nepalese hill districts where "acute scarcity bordering on famine" made Chandra Shamsher anxious.[1] The Prime Minister feared :

> that a big drain on the manpower could not only retard and hamper the gradual recovery of the economic condition [of the country], but may prove a source of serious anxiety to the government of Nepal in the near future.[2]

Even a "grave economic situation" might follow this large scale migration,[2a] for even transportation of goods needed manual labour, the country having hardly any vehicular traffic.[3]

The Nepalese State army was, too, affected by the migration,[3a] for the martial tribesmen of the country preferred serving in the Indian army with its better pay scale and other amenities, besides scope for active service which was scarcely available in the Nepalese army.[4] Of the more than 11,000 Gurkhas in the Indian army disbanded after the war, only 3,838 returned home ; the rest stayed on in India, expecting better means of livelihood than they could hope to get in Nepal.[5] Conseqently, Chandra Shamsher had to increase the pay scale of the state army ;[6] and he grudged this strain on the state exchequer. Indian railways skirting the Nepalese territory[7] facilitated the Gurkha migration to India. While nor-

mally it took more than six weeks for men of the western districts of Nepal[8] to reach Kathmandu for enrolment in the state army, they could reach Indian railheads in less than a week.[9]

British military authorities shared Chandra Shamsher's worry over the migration ;[10] the deep-seated economic discontent which it indicated was indeed a serious problem for the Rana government which could cause it trouble in future. The Indian government, therefore, co-operated with Chandra Shamsher in checking Gurkha migration to India. On being pressed by Chandra Shamsher, the Indian Government banned the employment of Gurkhas in the military police,[11] in tea gardens and other non-military services.[12] Chandra Shamsher's argument that non-military employment would affect the fighting standard of the Gurkhas convinced the British military authorities who, too, had noted that the Gurkhas domiciled in India steadily lost their martial calibre ; indeed "they were Gurkhas no longer excepting in name".[13]

Chandra Shamsher put a ban on Gurkhas of the Kathmandu valley and the districts immediately to its west and east[14] taking employment in the Indian army.[14a] The Government of India had also to abandon for the moment its project of the expansion of the Gurkha ranks. Of the thirty-three regiments with 42,500 men, the total strength of the corps at the end of the war, only twenty regiments with 18,542 men were retained and the rest disbanded. The existing corps needed an annual supply of 1,800 men from Nepal.[15] The Indian military authorities further decided that the Assam Rifles and Police battalions would no longer get recruits from Nepal ; these detachments would now be formed of only the local domiciled Gurkhas even if that impaired the efficiency of the the corps.[16]

The British government will have certainly noted the main reason why Chandra Shamsher was determined to prevent large scale Gurkha migration to India : such unrestricted migration as was going on would lessen the British dependence on the

Rana government for these men ; and then the Ranas would lose their main claim to British favours.

The Panipatya

That the Rana government looked upon the Gurkhas as the most important element of their policy towards the British government was further established by its ban on the employment of Gurkhas for overseas service.[17] Such service would cost the men their caste. The matter became quite an issue between Kathmandu and New Delhi when, during the war, hundreds of Gurkhas were sent for overseas service. Ultimately the Rana government, under pressure from New Delhi, decided to readmit the Gurkhas to caste provided they underwent purification ceremony and received a dispensation called *Panipatya* ; the ceremony would be conducted by Nepalese priests sent to Gurkha cantonments for the purpose, British officers in command of the Gurkha corps sent overseas were to certify that the men had observed caste rules, and then alone would the men get the *Panipatya*.[18] It was obvious that this rule was

> merely enforced by the the ruling class in Nepal as a political weapon to enable them to retain a hold on the Gurkha troops which are of such great value to the Government of India.[19]

Growth of political consciousness

The war years and after saw another problem for the Rana government, no less serious. The Nepalese were now exposed to extraneous influeces as never before. and in the resultant political and social consciousness in them, the Ranas saw a potential threat to their absolutist regime. The hundreds of Nepalese who served in India and abroad during the war and later did not fail to notice the many developments and progress in the countries of their sojourn and their absence at home.

The Nepalese having hardly any opportunities for education in their own country got them in India. The result was the gradual growth of a desire in them for social and political changes in Nepal. Indian railways near the Nepalese border and the Nepalese State Railways[20] facilitated closer contact with the Indians and the conveyance of progressive ideas into Nepal through this contact.

The influence of the Arya Samaj was already seen in a section of the Nepalese elite. The anticlerical, egalitarian and rational philosophy of the Arya Samaj was bitterly opposed by the powerful sacerdotal community in Nepal whose existing privileges demanded the maintenance of the social and political status quo with all its oppressive featutes. Repression followed. Madhabraj Joshi, an Arya Samajist, was imprisoned ; so were his sons, who were educated in India.[21] Gunadatta, a Panjabi Arya Samajist leader, who had gone to Nepal to popularise the tenets of the Samaj, was driven out.[22] The Bengalis being regarded as his "real enemies",[23] Chandra Shamsher expelled some of them from the country.

Chandra Shamsher could well see these signs of change in his country. He noted :

> with altered times and enlarged experience of the outside world, the idea of the people in general has undergone changes and expansion sometimes in unexpected direction ; and the government of the country cannot be too careful to read and weigh their views. From their sojourn in India and travel abroad under different atmosphere to what they were used to, our people too may be said to form no exception to this.[24]

The disbanded soldiers who returned to Nepal, for instance, were found to have imbibed a new set of ideas and a standard of living far above that of the classes to which they belonged ; and this caused them difficulty in adjusting themselves to the existing social and economic conditions of the country.[25]

Nepali Political Associations in India

In the 1920s the British concern over the Indian political unrest was matched by the Rana uneasiness over the influence of this unrest on the Npalese population in India and through them on the Nepalese at Kathmandu. The two governments, therefore, coordinated their policy to meet the situation. The fourth article of the treaty of 1923 provided that each government "will use all such measures as it may deem practicable to prevent its territory from being used for purposes inimical to the security of the other."

Political consciousness in the educated Nepalese in India was manifested in the formation of several associations by them ; and these gradually assumed an anti-Rana tone. They drew inspiration from the Indian political movement. Originally, these associations were non-political, their object being only to promote the social and cultural interests of the Nepalese in India. A Hillmen's Association was formed at Darjeeling.[26] Swami Visudhananda, described in Indian police report as a disciple of Gandhi, had close connection with the Association. The Swami went to Nepal but was prevented from going to Tibet.[27] The All India Buddhist Movement was led by one Dharmacharya, a Nepali socioreligious reformer.[28]

The Gorkhali

In 1919 a Nepali weekly, called *Gorkhali*, was published from Benares. It condemned the Rana government for the social backwardness of the people of Nepal, their want of education[29] and their poverty. The paper while demanding political rights for the Nepalese people, urged them to join the Non-co-operation and Satyagraha movements,[30] in India. Devi Prasad Sapkota edited the paper and Nan Singh Gurung, Lakshmi Prasad Sapkota, Dharanidhar Koirala, Dinanath Sharma, Pandit Krishna Prasad and several other enlightened Nepalese were associated with it. They were members of a

Gurkha association at Darjeeling, the declared object of which was to promote the educational, social and cultural interests of the Nepalese people. The Government, however, strongly suspected the Association having political objects and its members having been the purveyors of political literature in Nepal.

Dharanidhar Koirala and his associates were suspected to have won over to their cause a few Gurkha officers in the Indian army whose names were furnished to the Government of India by Chandra Shamsher.[31] The Fifth Gurkha Rifles[32] was particularly suspected of having been exposed to political propaganda by the anti-Rana Nepalese. However, a committee, appointed by the Government to investigate the matter, found no concrete evidence of anti-British feelings in the corps.[33]

The British and the Rana governments had common interest in preventing any political consciousness in the martial tribesmen of Nepal. The articles and comments in the *Gorkhali* on the economic insecurity of the Gurkhas in Nepal under the Rana rule were likely to further encourage their migration to India in larger numbers. Any more restriction on such migration by the Rana government was certain to create discontent in these tribesmen. This discontent could of course take no articulated and widespread form, for the people were poor, ignorant and backward and the communication system in the country extremely undeveloped. The British Envoy truly observed :

> It seems certain that artificially introduced dissatisfaction with their condition, such as the *Gorkhali* sets itself to bring about, can neither lead to any beneficial change in the form of government nor to improvement in material prosperity.[34]

Nevertheless, even any simmering discontent in the Gurkhas of Nepal could portend a grave danger to the Rana regime to which they had been loyal so far. That the British and the

Ranas took the same view of the matter is evident from another remark of the Envoy :

> In view of the great importance to India of the preservation of the political status quo in this country and the supply of Gurkha recrutis untainted with Indian advanced sentiment, our interests in this matter coincide with those of the Nepal government.[35]

The *Gorkhali* press was asked to submit a security bond as provided by the Indian Press Act, 1910.[36] In 1922, the publication of the paper was banned[37] and all those associated with it kept under strict watch by the Government. Chandra Shamsher himself launched a counter propaganda among the Nepalese at Benares dissuading them from entertaining the local anti-Rana elements.[38]

A Gurkha association was formed in Calcutta in 1926 to work for the social, economic and religious uplift of the Nepalese ; but since its president, one Agan Singh, had been implicated in the Non-co-operation movement, its activities were closely watched by the Government. The association raised a volunteer corps to prevent the abduction of Nepalese girls by Muslims. In 1928, Captain Thir Shamsher Rana, an expatriate,[39] was elected its acting president. However, chronic difficulties led to the dissolution of the association soon.[40]

The All India Gurkha League

The most well-known Nepalese association in India as well as the most active was the All India Gurkha League.[41] For about six years after its establishment at Dehra Dun in 1921, it avoided indulgence in political activities and then assumed a strongly anti-British and anti-Muslim tone ; a large number of Gurkha ex-servicemen became its members. The second annual session of the League at Dehra Dun in 1926 was attended by many retired Gurkha subedars and complimentary messages were received from Gurkha regiments ; such messages were also sent by the rulers of Jhalwar, Garhwal and Sikkim,

Resolutions were passed in the meeting urging the Rana government to lift the ban on foreign travel by the Nepalese.[42] The League wanted the modernisation of Nepal by extensive reforms of the kind undertaken by Amir Amanullah in Afghanistan[43] and the thirteenth Dalai Lama in Tibet.[44] In 1927 a new branch of the League was opened at Dibrugarh in Assam where there was a large Gurkha population.[45] That year the president of the League was Bahadur Shamsher, the son of Dev Shamsher, who was ousted from power as the Prime Minister of Nepal by Chandra Shamsher in 1901.[46]

Thakur Chandan Singh

The League was turned into a dynamic organisation by Thakur Chandan Singh. He was a member of the Nepalese nobility[47] and had a distinguished record of service in the Indian army during the first World War. After the war he served the Maharaja of Bikaner as his assistant secretary. He then joined the Indian National Congress and took part in the political agitations launched by the Congress.[48] In 1922 he left the Congress. He was elected president of the Gurkha League in 1926. He edited a paper called the *Himalayan Times* and later another paper, the *Tarun Gorkha* which was a weekly published from Dehra Dun. The paper, renamed *Gorkha Samsar*, became the organ of the League.[49] Through its columns Chandan Singh strongly urged for education and, particularly, the dissemination of technical and scientific knowledge among the Nepalese. In 1927 *Gorkha Samsar* had four hundred subscribers. Later its circulation was banned in the Gurkha cantonments.[49a] In the second session of the Gurkha League Chandan Singh proposed the setting up of an industrial and technical school for the Nepalese in India and a bank for them.[50]

The League had links with the All India Hindu Mahasabha and was bitterly anti-Muslim. In 1921 Chandan Singh had attended the Delhi session of the Mahasabha where he had

publicly renounced his war decorations and medals. In 1927-8, the League offered its services to the Maharaja of Kashmir to restore peace in the state, then torn by communal violence.[51] Chandan Singh and Ram Chandra Jang, the General Secretary of the League, attended the Ratnagiri session of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1931 where the former made a speech, declaring that, since the Gurkhas and Hindus were "blood brethren", they should act unitedly to defend themselves against the machinations of the Christians and the Muslims to destroy Hinduism.[52] Obviously, the League shared the Mahasabha's strong disapproval of what it viewed as the British policy of favouring the Muslims in the constitutional settlements of the time.

Several newspapers in India covered the activities of the League : *Sradhanand* of Bombay, *Kesari* of Poona, *Arjun* of Delhi and *Sri Krishna* of Calcutta, for example.[53] The papers urged the Rana government to undertake reforms and widen Nepal's external relations just as the Afghan Amir had done for his state. Captain Patwardhan, a pilot in the service of the Amir, went to Kathmandu to interest Chandra Shamsher in the matter.[54]

Political Demands of the League

The Gurkha League spelt out its political demands in 1931-2 in a memorial to the India Office,[55] The main demand was for the representation of Gurkhas[56] in the Round Table Conference[57] and the provision for suitable guarantees of their rights and interests in the future constitution of India either by granting them special representation or by the reservation of seats in the legislatures, both central and provincial.

In principle, the League, so it claimed, was opposed to communal electorates[58] and supported the principle of joint electorates for election to the Central and provincial legislatures. But should the Muslims be granted separate electorates, the Gurkhas, too, would demand them in the same proportion

as the Sikhs had claimed for themselves. The League wanted for the Gurkhas the same rights and privileges as the Sikhs had demanded, contending that the numerical strength of the Gurkhas in the population of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the United Provinces, Assam, Punjab and Burma[59] justified their representation in the local legislatures as a separate and distinct community. The League rejected "the foolish idea of communalising the public services" but demanded that Gurkhas born in India should be given the same opportunity for recruitment in public services[60] as the Sikhs had been given.

The League expressed its concern over the economic backwardness of Nepal and the resultant large scale migration of her people to India. It criticised the Government of India for having taken no step for the economic development of Nepal while condemning the Rana government for

> "its sheer inaction, indifference and apathy, sometimes bordering on open hostility"

to any sign of social awakening and progressive ideas among the Gurkhas in India.[61]

The League disclaimed any opposition to Gurkha recruitment ; rather it would encourage recruitment for economic reasons. But it grumbled that Gurkhas born in India were not ordinarily recruited in the army—and that less because they lacked martial qualities than because they were comparatively more educated than the Gurkhas born in Nepal and so likely to be far less docile than the latter.

In fact, the allegation of the League was not without any substance. Educated Gurkhas were, indeed, not enrolled in the Indian army, for they were suspected as potential transmitters of political ideas to the Gurkha regiments. The Government event dropped the scheme of giving the Gurkhas training in the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and in the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun ; nor would it give educated Gurkhas command of the Gurkha regiments. For the same political reason no Indian officer was ever given command of these regiments.[62]

The League in its memorial disavowed any political activity, its declared concern being only the social, economic and educational advancement of the Gurkhas in India. But then, it was far from unconcerned with the political movements in India. In fact, it expressed the "strongest support" to the "patriotic aspirations and the legitimate demands" of the Indians for the early grant of dominion status. The League saw in further constitutional reforms in India greater scope for the promotion of the interests of the Nepalese population in India.

Yet, at the same time the League would not risk the open hostility of either the British or the Rana governments by any activity prejudicial to their interests. In the memorial the League disclaimed association with any movement in India which was disruptive of law and order. It condemned the Civil Disobedience Movement[63] launched by Gandhi and expressed its loyalty to both the Rana and the British governments :

> our object is to strengthen the bonds of friendship and alliance which happily exist between the Governments of India and Nepal and to keep the Gurkhas loyal citizens of British India.[64]

A former president of the League and President of the Gurkha Arbitration Court in India, Thir Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana, wrote to the Private Secretary of the Viceroy urging the Government to desist from employing the Gurkhas in quelling nationalist agitations, for it created ill-feelings between the Indians and Gurkhas. He further pointed out that it was odd that while the Anglo-Indians were a far smaller community than the Gurkhas in India,[65] it was they whom the Government would give separate representation in the Legislative Assembly[66] and a seat in the Round Table Conference. Thir Shamsher even lobbeyed with the Indian delegation to the Round Table Conference for the sake of Gurkha interests. He also warned the Government that the promotion of political and economic interests of the Gurkhas in India could alone prevent

the spread of the influence of the Civil Disobedience movement in them.[67]

Congress activities during the Civil Disobedience Movement

Thir Shamsher's warning was timely. Top Congress leaders had, indeed, been trying to recruit Nepali volunteers for the Civil Disobedience Movement, seeking to use them to sow sedition in Gurkha regiments. On 14 November 1930, the Delhi C.I.D. arrested two Gurkhas, Kharag Bahadur Singh and Dhanapati Singh, at the Delhi railway station when they were on their way to Ahmedabad.[68]

Kharag Bahadur was "the chief anti-British propagandist among Gurkhas". In 1927 while a law student in Calcutta and Secretary of a local Gurkha association, he was sentenced to eight years' rigorous imprisonment for a murderous assault on a Marwari businessman who had purchased a Nepali girl. However, on remission of the sentence, he was released in March 1929. Then, in the *Bombay Chronicle* an article of his appeared, appealing to the Nepalese "to atone for the misdeeds of their own kinsmen who have fought against their own Indian kinsmen", and asking them to join the Congress and take an active part in the Civil Disobedience Movement. In June 1930, Kharag Bahadur and thirteen Gurkha volunteers of the Congress were arrested while going to Dharsana to meet Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, he was lodged in the Sabarmati jail for three months. After release, he was rearrested in November 1930 at the Delhi Railway station. With him were found a number of seditious pamphlets and letters which clearly established the involvement of Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Deshbandhu Gupta, Mahabir Tyagi and other Congress leaders in anti-British intrigues in the Gurkha corps.

Motilal Nehru

Motilal in one of his letters to Kharag Bahadur asked him

to carry on Congress propaganda among t' e Nepalese in India in general and Gurkha soldiers in particular. He also asked Kharag Bahadur to enrol Gurkhas as Congress volunteers. He was assured that the Congress, when in power, would safeguard the rights and interests of the Gurkhas. In another letter Motilal informed Kharag Bahadur that Jawaharlal had agreed to issue on behalf of the Congress an authoritative declaration that the Gurkhas in India were an integral section of the Indian population and that they and the Indians were like brothers. Motilal's letter also referred to the payment by the Congress of a monthly allowance to each Gurkha volunteer to work for the Congress.[69]

Kharag Bahadur had earlier met Motilal at Allahabad and Sardar Patel at Ahmedabad and both had promised him financial assistance to sustain his activity in the Gurkha military lines. Motilal had, however, doubted the feasibility of Kharag Bahadur's scheme of establishing an All India Fund to provide financial assistance to needy Gurkhas in India. Some papers found from Kharag Bahadur contained names of several Gurkha officers of the Ninth Gurkha Rifles.

Dhanpati Singh, a dismissed Gurkha soldier, had joined the Congress, having been inspired by the speeches of Swami Vijayananda and Mahabir Tyagi. He and Kharag Bahadur had toured through several villages in Dehra Dun urging the local Nepalese not to serve the British government and to join the Congress movement. He was with Kharag Bahadur when Congress volunteers raided the Dharsana salt depot.[70] While serving his sentence in the Sabarmati jail, he came in contact with Abbas Tyabji, Sardar Patel, Gandhi's sons and other Congress leaders, who encouraged him to spread the Congress ideology among the Gurkhas ; and for this he was assured financial assistance. He wrote several leaflets in Nepali for distribution among Gurkha soldiers, encouraging them to join the Civil Disobedience Movement.[71]

There were some more evidences of Congress intrigues at this time. Several Congress volunteers were arrested at Jaynagar

a Nepalese border town, for attempted interference with the entry of foreign cloth into Nepal.[72] Ananta Lal Sharma, a Nepali resident of Assam, was sentenced for trying to enlist local Gurkha soldiers in the Civil Disobedience Movement.[73] The Rana government also received many reports from their agents in India about Congress efforts at utilising some politically-minded Nepalese to sow anti-British spirit in the Gurkha corps. Gurkhas posted at Darjeeling and in Assam districts were particularly suspected.[74]

All this convinced the Government of India of the deeplaid Congress conspiracy which gave :

> a lie to Gandhi's claim that Congress law-breakers have been guilty of nothing worse than the contravention of certain special ordinances.[75]

It was patent to the Government that the Civil Disobediance Movement was not as peaceful as Congress leaders had claimed it to be. However, in view of the recently-concluded Gandhi-Irwin Pact,[76] the Government chose to wink at the incidents. No further enquiry was made to establish Motilal and Jawaharlal's offence, partly because of the want of proof of their having incited violence and partly because any thorough search into Congress offices for more incriminating materials, followed by the arrest of Congress leaders, would have further aggravated the Government's strained relations with the Congress and stirred up graver popular unrest. Besides, such a step would also have given undesirable publicity to the Congress intrigues in Gurkha regiments.[77]

Kharag Bahadur was sentenced to five month's rigorous imprisonment. After being released, he was suspected to have gone to Nepal and to have enrolled himself in the Nepalese State army under an assumed name.[78]

The Subsidy to Nepal and the Capitalisation scheme

The progressive realisation of self-government by the Indians after the Montford reforms[79] caused the Rana govern-

ment another worry : a future nationalist government in India might repudiate the annual subsidy to Nepal[80] and also discontinue recruiting Gurkhas for the Indian army. When, in 1919, the Government of India decided to make the annual payment to Nepal, Sir B. N. Basu, a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, had, in fact opposed it as an unnecessary burden on the Indian government.[81] Since then, both the payment of the subsidy and the Goverment's employment of Gurkha troops to suppress the nationalist agitation had come in for strong criticisms in the Indian press[81a] and the Central Legislative Assembly. To squash the criticism, Sir Denys Bray, the Secretary to the Foreign Department, had even to lobby with Vithalbhai Patel, the President of the Assembly, and also with the leaders of the Swarajya party, in the Assembly.[82]

Chandra Shamsher had on various occasions raised the issue of the subsidy. Although he could see no prospect of an Independent India outside the British Empire, he was worried over the subsidy :

> becoming targets for discussion in an increasingly democratic legislature within the British Empire—an Empire impotent to prevent Nepal from being insulted, but strong enough to keep Nepal from hitting back.[83]

Kathmandu could hardly afford to forego the amount it had earned by its services to the Government of India any more than it could take armed action to realise the amout if stopped by a nationalist government of India. Therefore, it wanted a firm commitment from London that it would continue the payment of the subsidy ; the existing guarantee by New Delhi was not deemed adequate. Chandra Shamsher repeatedly suggested that either the amount be capitalised in irremediable, non-transferable Government securities endorsed to Nepal and yielding an interest of Rupees ten lakhs tax free or a tract of land be given to Nepal in lieu of the subsidy.[84]

The British Envoys and Ministers at Kathmandu generally

supported the capitalisation scheme but not the Government—and that mainly for political reasons. The subsidy constituted an effective economic hold on the Nepalese government and a guarantee of its friendly policy in future. It was, in fact, a conditional gift : "a recurring *quid pro quo* for the recurring condition, viz., the maintenance of good behaviour" on the part of the Nepalese government.[85] Turning this conditional gift into an absolute one would result in the loss of an important lever for the Indian government—the more so when, after the death of Chandra Shamsher, New Delhi was worried over his successors' ability, if not the desire, to continue his friendly policy towards the British government.

Kathmandu's anxiety over the subsidy issue seemed to London, too, rather baseless, for in Lord Chelmsford's assurance given at the time of its first payment in 1919[86] the Rana government had already got the firm commitment of the British government. Any further guarantee by the Home government was both unnecessary and undesirable, for it would imply London's want of confidence in New Delhi's "ability in future to make good promises made in the past".[87] Besides, no matter the form in which such a grant was made to Nepal, public comments and criticisms were unavoidable. And as for a tract of land, there was none which could be given to Nepal.

But the Rana government would not leave the matter at that. Chandra Shamsher's successors repeatedly brought it up, further progress towards self-government in India following the operation of the 1935 constitution[88] being their immediate excuse. Colonel F. M. Bailey, the British Minister at Kathmandu, like his predecessors, lent his support : if capitalisation scheme was not deemed feasible by the Government, at least some lands could be made over to Nepal or to its Prime Minister as his personal estate. Bailey urged :

> I still feel that the cession of at least some land is the best solution . . . It would give immense satisfaction to the Nepalese who are daily performing services to us in discouraging all agitation against the Government of

> India which would easily find a focus in this Hindu Kingdom. Even a passive attitude in the matter would give us immense trouble.[89]

The land ceded to Nepal in 1858 in recognition of Jang Bahadur's services in the Mutiny was cited by Bailey as a precedent.[89a] He further pointed out that the subsidy could, in fact, be no better a guarantee of Nepal's good behaviour than a similar grant had proved effective to prevent Afghan hostility to the British government.[90]

Even these arguments failed to move either New Delhi or London.[91] Nepal was of such vital importance to India both from the military point of view and also "as a bulwark of our frontier" that it was essential to maintain the "permanent tie" on it which the annual payment constituted.[92] This was all the more so when Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, China, Soviet Russia and France[92a] seemed keen on establishing relations with Kathmandu. New Delhi clearly spelt out its policy :

> Although the Government of India fully admitted the independence of Nepal to be as complete as that of Afghanistan, it is an essential part of their policy to maintain and secure their influence in the kingdoms on the Indian glacis—a policy which can best be pursued by the grant of financial or other aid at recurring intervals. The continuance of Nepal within the Indian political, military and commercial orbit through the maintenance and, if possible, strengthening of existing ties must, therefore, be a cardinal feature in India's foreign policy.[93]

Kathmandu then suggested that the subsidy be incorporated in the Public Debt of India ; this, too, was unacceptable to the Government, for it was certain to raise a storm of public criticism in India.[94] To allay the Rana government's anxiety, the British government did no more than assure it that the payment of the subsidy would not be affected by any constitutional changes in India and that discussions on the grant in the Central Legislative Assembly could be prevented by the

exercise of the Governor-General's special powers under the Government of India Act, 1935.[95]

The second World War provided the Rana government with a fresh opportunity to pressurise the British. Keeping Kathmandu in good humour being the pressing necessity at this time, the Indian government was even prepared to double the amount of the subsidy, but its opposition to the schemes of capitalisation of the amount and cession of land remained unchanged.[96] L. S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, asked Simha Shamsher, the Nepalese Minister in London,[97] to entertain no fear of the constitutional changes in India resulting in the establishment of a government unfriendly to Nepal. He cited the instances of revolutionary France and Stalin's Russia to prove that notwithstanding great political changes, nations generally tended to swing back to their established foreign policy.[98] And there the matter rested.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. PEF, 3085/1912, Pt. 1 : Reg. No. 2920/1919 : Notes of discussion between R. E. Holland and Chandra Shamsher, 13, 15 Apr. 1919.
2. IFP, Vol. 10890, Sept. 1920, No. 17 : Chandra's Memo to W. F. O'Connor, Envoy.

2a. Ibid.

3. Not until the first world war did the Rana government take any step for the development of communication in the country. In 1927, Chandra Shamsher built a light railway from Raxaul on the Indian border to Amlekhganj at the foothills of the Tarai—a distance of twentyfive miles. Later another railway line was laid between Jaynagar and Bijalpura—a distance of thirtyfive miles. Bhimphedi and Kathmandu (14 miles) were connected by an aerial ropeway for the conveyance of goods. From Amlekhganj to Kathmandu (almost fifty miles) there was a road, a part of which was motorable. To the Ranas improved means of communication and the security of the state had an inverse relationship. EC, 21-5 : Who is Who in

Nepal, 1949 ; 21-51 : Reg. No. 867/1937 : Annual Report on Political Situation in Nepal for the year 1935-6. IFP (Ext.), Reg. No. 6/1925.

3a. PEF, 3035/1912, Pt. 1 : Reg. No. 2920/1919 : Notes of discussion between Holland and Chandra, 15 Apr. 1919.

4. Nepal's military expansion towards Tibet was checked first by China (Tibet's suzerain) and, after its power in Tibet had waned, by the British government. The Treaty of Segouli ended Nepalese expansion to the South and West. Sikkim was converted into a British protectorate and later Bhutan was reduced to about the same status—and this made any Nepalese expansion to the east impossible. See my article "British Policy in Nepal, 1767-1947", *The Modern Review*, June 1966, pp. 471-79.

5. F. O. 766/10 : Chandra to O'Connor, 7 Dec. 1919.

6. From Rupees seven per month, the pay was increased to Rupees eleven. Memorandum on Nepal, 1922. op.cit., p. 6.

7. Along the southern frontier of Nepal lay the Bengal and North-Western Railway and on the South-Eastern border, the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway.

8. That is the Magars, Chetris, Thakurs and Khas. There were Magar and Gurung colonies in the regions to the immediate east of Kathmandu.

9. Eight of the ten Gurkha regiments used to have men recruited from western and central Nepal and they entered British India at Nautanwa ; they took the train at Bridgemaniganj on the Bengal and North-Western Railway. Gurkhas recruited from eastern Nepal took the train at Darjeeling, Purnea and Laheriasarai. Bruce and Northey, "Nepal", op.cit., p. 394. Ministry of Defence, U. K., *Nepal and the Gurkhas* (London, 1965), pp. 133-40.

10. Bruce, op.cit., p. 218. Bruce and Northey, op.cit., p. 298. R. L. Kennion, "England and Nepal" *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Jan. 1922, pp. 54-5.

11. There were Gurkhas in the Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry, Naga Hills Force, Surma Valley Military Police and Burma Police. WP, Vol. 24 : Minute on Native Troops, 28 July 1893. IMP, May 1893, Nos. 439, 1232-3. EC, 21-8 : Reg. No. 8124/1933, Memorandum on Nepal, by C. T. Daukes, Envoy, 1933.

12. IFP. Vol. 9264, Nov. 1913, Nos. 1-8 ; Vol. 10890, Sept. 1920, No. 19. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 7107/1930.

13. Kennion, "England and Nepal", op.cit., p. 54. Bruce, op.cit., p. 218.

14. That is the Magars and Gurungs, the best military tribes whom the British prized most.

14a. EC, 21-51 : Reg. No. 861/1937 : 21-18 : Reg. No. 8124/1931, Dauke's Memorandum. op.cit.

15. F. O. 766/10 ; Government to Kennion, 28 Apr. 1920.

16. George Dunbar, *Frontiers* (London, 1932), pp. 76, 286-7.

17. The issue first came up when the Fourth Gurkhas returned from China after the Boxer rebellion. IFP (Ext.-Sec.), Aug. 1900, Nos. 208-15. Two Gurkhas who attended the coronation ceremony of King George V as his personal orderlies were ostracized, leading to the King's intervention on their behalf. Chandra Shamsher pleaded helplessness : "In matters like these whatever my personal views may be, I must conform to the opinion of the priesthood and the people who regarded the issue having an "intimate bearing upon the vital religious and social customs and beliefs of the country". F. O 766/11 ; Chandra to Manners Smith, Resident, 6 Nov., 24 Dec. 1913. HP, Vol. 105 : Major Wigram to Duboulay, P.S. to Viceroy, 15 May 1913, 1 Jan. 1914.

18. F. O. 766/11 : Chandra to O'Connor, 16 Mar. 1919. *Panipatyas* were given only when the men were in "bonafide active service". Two Gurkhas who were sent by the Indian government to participate in the victory celebrations after the first world war, were not readmitted to caste, despite the requests of the Indian government on their behalf. IFP, (Ext.-A), Vol 10890 : March 1920, Nos. 1-8. W. B. Northey and C. J. Morris, *The Gurkhas* (London, 1928), pp. 103-04. Nigel Woodyatt, *Under Ten Viceroys* (London, 1923), pp. 164-5.

19. Dauke's Memorandum, op.cit., p. 12.

20. See fn. 3 above.

21. Balchandra Sharma, *Nepalko Aitihasik Ruprekha* (Benaras, 2008 V. S.), p. 388.

22. G. P. Bhattacharya, *India and Politics of Modern Nepal* (Calcutta, 1970), p. 19.

23. F. O. 766/1 : Note by Envoy, 7 May 1925.

24. Ibid. 766/10 : Chandra to O'Connor, 18 Oct. 1919.

25. Ibid. : Chandra's memorandum to O'Connor.

26. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 7107/1930.

27. IFP (Ext.-Sec), File No. 464/1926.

28. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 7107, 7875/1930.

29. Dhir Shamsher, father of Chandra Shamsher, established an English primary school at Kathmandu and a Sanskrit boarding school there. The first High English school was set up at Kathmandu in 1880—an entirely aristocratic institution. Deb Shamsher set up many vernacular schools. In 1919 Chandra Shamsher established the Tri Chandra College at Kathmandu. It was raised to the B.A. standard in 1924. By 1928 there were sixty primary schools in the country

built over the last thirty years. Padma Shamsher established basic training and girls' schools. A few, mostly members of the Rana and other aristocratic families, went to medical and engineering institutions in India. In 1947 there were only four high schools in Nepal. In 1948 there were only seven M.As and B.As, 48 undergraduates and 14 with Sanskrit degrees. PSLI, Vol. 87 : Reg. No. 293, Annual Report on Nepal, 1895. Landon, op.cit., p. 180. Northey and Morris, op.cit., Foreword by C. G. Bruce, p. xxix. S. C. Das Gupta, "Modern Nepal", *The Modern Review*, Aug. 1925, pp. 202-03. Hemalata Devi, *Nepale Banganari* (Calcutta, 1912), pp. 3, 14, 101-03. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 855/1930.

Chandra Shamsher was against the spread of education for without a commensurate expansion in employment opportunities, it was certain to generate discontent in the people as it had in India. H. Wilkinson Guillemard, op.cit., p. 273.

30. This non-violent movement was launched by the Indian National Congress in 1920-21 under the leadership of Gandhi. The programme included the renunciation of government titles, the boycotting of government educational institutions, law courts, legislatures and elections. The ultimate object of the movement was non-payment of taxes. The bonfire of English cloths and passive resistance to Government led to mass arrests. The movement was called off by Gandhi in 1922. R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Roychoudhuri and K. K. Datta, *An Advanced History of India* (London, 1953) p. 986.
31. IFP, (Int.—Sec.), Sept. 1919, Nos. 11-12.
32. The corps was raised in 1858. *Historical Record of the Fifth Gurkha Regiment*, p. 170.
33. IFP (Ext-Sec-B), Aug. 1921, Nos. 120-37.
34. Ibid. : Envoy to Government, 4 Aug. 1920.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. : Chief Secretary, U. P. to Secretary, Home Dept. (Political), 20 Nov. 1920.
37. Regmi, op.cit., p. 146. However, the editor of the paper was not deported to Kathmandu despite the insistence of Chandra Shamsher and the Envoy's strong pleading on his behalf. IFP (Ext-Sec-B), Aug. 1921, Nos. 120-37.
38. Ramprasad Satpal, *Shri Chandra Darsan : Nepalma Ramrajya*.
39. Thir Shamsher was a son of Durga Shamsher, an illegitimate son of Dhir Shamsher. Thir was thus a nephew of Chandra Shamsher.
40. EC, 21/2 : Reg. No. 489/1932.
41. HPP, File No. 258/1931. EC, 21/2 : Reg. No. 489/1932.
42. No Nepali could go overseas without obtaining prior permission of the religious authorities of the country. EC, 21-51 : Reg. No. 861/1937.

43. Amanullah ascended the throne in 1919 and was ousted from power in 1929 by the orthodox elements in the court who opposed his many-sided reforms, social, educational and legal, undertaken after his European tour in 1928.
44. For his life and policies, see Bell, op.cit.
45. In Assam districts they constituted 7.1 per cent. of the total population. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 3298/1930.
46. During his rule of three months Dev Shamsher tried to abolish slavery and encourage the spread of education which alarmed the obscurantists. After being overthrown, he fled to Darjeeling. He failed to get British assistance to regain power. He died in Mussoorie in 1914. PSLI, Vol. 130 : Reg. No. 447/1901 ; Vol. 135 : Reg. Nos. 949, 957/1901 ; Vol. 139 : Reg. No. 1446A/1901.
47. He was a son-in-law of Kharag Shamsher (a brother of Chandra Shamsher) who disowned him for his political views. IFP, (Ext-Sec), File No. 486/1926.
48. He took part in the Rowlatt Act agitations and the agitation following the Jallianwallahbagh massacre in 1919.
49. Dauke's Memorandum, op.cit.

49a. Ibid.

50. IFP (Ext-Sec), Reg. No. 486/1926 : Report in the *Pioneer*, 10 June 1926.
51. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 489/1932.
52. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 8124/1933 ; 21-2 : Reg. No. 489/1932.
53. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 66 (2)/1928.
54. Ibid.
55. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 489/1932.
56. That is, the Nepalese domiciled in India. Men of Nepalese origin were all called the Gurkhas, their more popular name.
57. In 1930-32 there were three conferences in London to decide the course of constitutional progress in India.
58. Communal representation was first introduced by the Morley-Minto Reforms (1909) and widely extended by the Montford Reforms (1919).
59. Thir Shamsher put the number of domiciled Nepalese in India to twenty million. EC, 21-2 : Reg, No. 7879/1931 in 489/1932. The Government figure, however, was only three lakhs. EC, 21-18 : Dauke's Memorandum, op.cit.
60. Under the existing rules only those Nepalese born in India and those naturalised were eligible for public services. Men of the martial classes were ineligible for civil appointments. 21-6 : Reg. No. 5949/1940. IFP (ext.), File No. 176/1936.

In 1921 Chandra Shamsher had vainly requested the British government to appoint has nephew, Jagat Shamsher, in the Indian Civil Service. IFP (Int-B), Oct. 1921, No. 130.

61. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 489/1932.
62. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 149/1931. The Chief of the General Staff held that Gurkhas, not being British subjects, were ineligible for commissions in the Indian army and they were not educated enough to compete for the King's Commission. Ibid.
63. It was a country-wide non-violent agitation launched by the Congress under Gandhi's leadership. The movement began with the illicit manufacture of salt as a defiance of the existing unpopular salt tax. British goods were boycotted and mass involvement made the movement widespread. In the first few months about 60,000 men were arrested.
64. See above.
65. See fn. 59 above.
66. The Anglo-Indians got this right under the Montford Reforms.
67. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 7879/1931 in 489/1932. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 212/1930.
68. Ibid. : Reg. Nos. 938, 1410/1931, 5371/1935. HPP : File No. 14-19/1931.
69. Ibid.
70. The Salt depot was raided as a part of the Congress action during the Civil Disobedience Movement.
71. EC, 21-2 : Reg. Nos. 25, 1410/1931.
72. Ibid : Reg. Nos. 253, 636/1931.
73. Ibid : Reg. Nos. 114/1931, 1170, 1316/1932.
74. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 4291/1930, 2230, 5831/1931. IFP (Ext-Sec-B), Aug. 1921. Nos. 120-37.
75. HPP : File No. 14-9/1931, Dept. Notes.
76. In Feb-March 1931, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, held talks with Gandhi to meet the political crisis created by the Civil Disobedience Movement. The talks ended in a settlement whereby the Congress called off the Movement and political prisoners were released. The Congress also agreed to take part in the second Round Table Conference, it having boycotted the first.
77. HPP, File No. 14-9/931, Dept. Notes.
78. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 5371/1935.
79. The main principle of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (for short Montford Reforms) was the recognition of self-government as the goal of the British policy in India, the goal to be reached by stages and self-government meaning parliamentary government.

80. See Chapter 1 above.
81. He held that since the subsidy was a reward for Nepal's services in the first world war which originated in Europe, a part of it at least should have been charged on the Imperial exchequer instead of making its payment from the Indian exchequer alone. PEF, 3085/1912, Pt. 1 ; Reg. No. 2920/1919, Sir B. N. Basu's Note, 14 June 1919.

81a. *The Modern Review* (Calcutta, July, 1925) pointed out that the subsidy was paid to Nepal to ensure the supply of Gurkhas who were used by the British government to quell the nationalist agitations. This amounted to India making payments to Nepal for her own subjection. *The Englishman* (Calcutta) published a letter to the Editor on 10 February 1922 criticising the payment of the subsidy. Earlier, on 14 Aug. 1920, the paper had published a speech by Bepin Chandra Pal, the Extremist leader, criticising the subsidy.

82. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 2600/1935. Note by D. Bray, 4 Dec. 1935. Under the leadership of C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru, the Swarajya party initiated a new policy. While the Congress boycotted the elections for the Council as provided in the Montford reforms, the Swarajya party contested the elections with a view to wrecking the reforms from within by "uniform, consistent and continuous obstruction." With the death of Das in 1925 and Motilal joining the Congress, the party ceased to exist.
83. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928 : Note by D. Bray, 29 Dec. 1927.
84. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 4029/1924 ; also Telg. from Viceroy to Secretary of State. 18 Oct. 1929 in Reg. No. 6733/1929.
85. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928 : Note by J. G. Acheson, 25 Jan. 1928. Also EC, 21-10 ; Reg. No. 1607/1923.
86. See my book, op. cit., pp. 204-05.
87. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928 : Telg. from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 Nov. 1929.
88. The Act provided for an All-India Federation consisting of Governors' Provinces, Chief Commissioners' Provinces and the Federating Indian States ; it also provided for Provincial Autonomy with a government responsible to an elected legislature in every Governor's Province.
89. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 7526/1935, Bailey to Government, 23 Sept. 1935. Also Reg. No. 4651/1935.

89a. The entire lowland between the rivers Kali and Rapti and that between the Rapti and the district of Gorakhpur, which had been wrested from Nepal after her defeat in 1816, was restored to her. See my article "Nepal and the Indian Mutiny, 1857-58", *BPP*, Jan-June 1966, pp. 13-39.

90. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 7526/1935.
91. Ibid. : Reg. No. 6337/1935.
92. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 131/1935, Note by Olaf Caroe, 30 July 1935.
92a. Ibid.
93. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 6337/1935, Indian Foreign Secretary to Political Secretary, India Office, 22 Aug. 1935.
94. Ibid. : Reg. No. 6733/1929. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928, 131/1935.
95. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 6337/1935, Dept. Notes. The Act provided for some specifically "reserved" subjects such as foreign affairs, defence etc. which were to be under the charge of the Governor-General alone. Even in regard to "transferred" subjects under the charge of Ministers, the Governor-General was given special powers and responsibility and authority to act on his own discretion.
96 EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 2903, 5240/1941, 6480/1942, 724, 5096/1943.
97. From 1934 Nepal was allowed to have an accredited Minister in London. The British Envoy at Kathmandu was also designated from the same year as Minister.
98. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 6480/1942, L. S. Amery's interview with the Nepalese Minister, 13 Nov. 1942.

CHAPTER THREE

Nepal After Chandra Shamsher

The thirtees saw pressure on the Rana government intensified on account of two factors : the aggravated dissensions in the Rana family after the death of Shamsher ; and the coalescence of anti-Rana elements in Nepal and those in India. Besides, closer links were forged between the latter and nationalist forces in India. The Rana government's dependence on the British increased in proportion to the gravity of their troubles, resulting in deeper British influence on Nepal's internal politics.

The death of Chandra Shamsher : His successors.

The death of Chandra Shamsher in November 1929[1] removed the strongman of Nepal ; it also removed the most effective safeguard against the internal subversion of the Rana regime caused by ambition for power, jealousy and ceaseless intrigues in the Rana family itself.[2]

Chandra Shamsher's successor was his brother, Bhim Shamsher, described in an earlier British report as an "upright, loyal and straightforward man with plenty of ability".[3] He, however, showed none of these qualities during his two-year rule—an uneventful one except for a projected war against Tibet which the British government averted by political pressure on both Kathmandu and Lhasa.[4] While Kathmandu grudged this interference with its external independence, New Delhi suspected that Bhim Shamsher had been trying to create an external emergency just to strengthen his position at home.[5]

Yuddha Shamsher[6] was the next Prime Minister whose assumption of power was so hasty as to appear "more in the

nature of a seizure of power than an ordinary succession"—he assumed authority even before the period of mourning was over.[7] The British Envoy had earlier seen him as "a man of strong character and ability".[8] As Prime Minister, however, he hardly justified this impression ; he became universally unpopular as much for his repressive policy as for his lecherous character. And on this the British Minister at Kathmandu, Colonel Geoffrey Betham, reported :

> There is no doubt that Sir Juddha Shamsher is a naughty old man and his way of life has left much to be desired and all the number of his illegitimate children are said to be a legion ; a conservative estimate is over one hundred sons and daughters spread over the length and breadth of Nepal. Officially he claims nineteen illegitimate sons . . . . It has been and still is, as far as I am aware, his practice to pick up any damsel that takes his wayward fancy and then to return her, with a few rupees clutched in her hand, to her parents or her husband. Naturally, this kind of behaviour does not earn him the respect or affection of the masses in Nepal. The powerful priestly community, so long a buttress of the Rana regime, was particularly indignant.[9]

Padma Shamsher, who took over as the next Prime Minister, was in his youth a man of pleasant, friendly manners and a good sportsman".[10] With age, however, he developed a withdrawn and retiring disposition. Unlike other Ranas, he lived a very simple, frugal life,[11] spending many hours a day in prayer and meditation with his thoughts ranging "more on the next world than on this", to quote a contemporary British intelligence report.[12] No wonder, such a man proved utterly ineffective in the stirring times when he assumed power immediately after the second World War.

Of the younger generation in the Rana family, none but the sons of Chandra Shamsher showed any promise. Most of them were young when Chandra died ; they lacked in education and proved wanting in character. The three elder sons of

Chandra Shamsher, Mohan, Baber and Kaiser,[13] educated, able, experienced and a determined trio, made their sway felt in all important affairs of the state while biding their time to clinch the supreme power.[14] Their vaulting ambition added to the tension in the Rana family.

Tension in the Rana family : *The Roll of Succession*

In fact, the Rana system of government itself provided for built-in tension. The corner-stone of the system was the order of succession to the Prime Ministership, the most important office of the state.[15] It was the change in the order by the ruling Prime Ministers that increased the familial bitterness and intrigues. The general principle of the order of succession was that brother succeded brother until the whole of one generation was exhausted whereupon the next generation followed in order of seniority of age. The system established by Jang Bahadur in 1856 was intended to prevent assumption of power by minors and to ensure that each succeeding Prime Minister was a person of experience and authority. The object was also to strengthen the office of the Prime Minister or the virtual ruler against any possible revival of the power of the kings.[16] But then, Jang Bahadur did not take into account that :

> age alone is not a qualification for office nor the expansion of the number of eligibles in each succeeding generation, so close together in age that they are jealously tumbling over one another and that none could eventually attain office in the ordinary way until well over sixty years of age.[17]

Besides, the scheme of succession did not provide for any means to determine the fitness of candidates for the office and, in consequence, every ruling Prime Minister set his own standard of fitness.[18] All this naturally bred frustration in most members of the family and propensity to intrigue in the more ambitious and determined ones.

In the first roll of succession drawn up by Jang Bahadur in 1856, all his brothers were named as his successors to be followed by his sons – all according to seniority of age. He revised the roll in 1868, dropping from it the brothers who had plotted against him. He then got the revised roll affixed on the temple of Pasupatinath, thus investing it with the sacrosanctity that was needed to secure its inviolability.[19] However, even this roll of succession was changed when, in 1885, Bir Shamsher came to power after killing the ruling Prime Minister, Ranuddip Singh.[20] The slab of stone on the temple having on it the engraved roll of succession was removed and further revision made in the roll. Bir's illegitimate sons were inducted into the roll and one of them, Rudra Shamsher, was placed next to Yuddha Shamsher, the last surviving brother of the Prime Minister. All the sons and grandsons of Jang Bahadur and all sons of Kharag Bahadur were removed from the roll.[21]

Chandra Shamsher made an attempt to change the order of succession with a view to enabling his second and the most favourite son, Baber, to succeed him. But the scheme fell through on account of the stubborn opposition of his brothers and nephews, all being older in age and so above him in the roll.[22]

Bhim Shamsher, the next Prime Minister, also revised the roll of succession in such a way as to benefit his illegitimate sons, Hiranya Shamsher and Rama Shamsher.[23]

In 1934, the ruling Prime Minister, Yuddha Shamsher, caused a further change in the roll of succession.[24] He removed from the roll all the 'C' class Ranas-men born of mistresses in the Rana family.[25] Some of these men were either expelled from Nepal or removed to far away places in the state on official assignments. Rudra Shamsher, the eldest of the 'C' class Ranas, who would have succeeded Yuddha Shamsher, was sent away from Kathmandu. In this measure against the 'C' class Ranas, Chandra Shamsher's sons had a hand and, no wonder, in the new roll of succession Mohan, Baber and Kaiser moved up, followed immediately by Bahadur Shamsher, the son of

Yuddha, And there was no love lost between Bahadur and Chandra Shamsher's sons.[26] The Rana emigres in India constituted a source of intrigue and trouble for the Ranas in power; they joined the anti-Rana Nepali organisations in India and financed them.

The Nepalese Royal Family

After the death of Chandra Shamsher the involvement of the Nepalese royal family in anti-Rana intrigues introduced a new factor in Nepalese policies. The reduction of the kings of Nepal to political impotence was an important feature of the Rana political system.[27] The resultant despair had driven them to attempts at coups the failure of which had caused their virtual imprisonment by the Prime Ministers in power. To prevent royal hostility, the Ranas had forged marriage relations with the royal family.[28] Even then, the fear of the king persisted. The British Envoy, Wilkinson, found in 1929 the "relics of a king's party in Nepal"[29] and reports of his successors confirmed it. Later, anti-Rana elements established links with the king and his family, seeking to use them to overthrow the Rana regime.

Anti-Rana activities in Nepal

After Chandra Shamsher's death, his widow developed strained relations with Bhim Shamsher and for a time lived in Calcutta, drawing to her a large number of emigre Ranas. To relieve Bhim Shamsher's worry, the Government of India had to put pressure on her to return to Kathmandu.[30] In June 1930, Basant Shamsher, a nephew of Bhim Shamsher,[30a] was found implicated in a conspiracy against the Prime Minister. The main accomplices were Subba Rammani and his brothers, all educated in India and strongly influenced by the political movements there.[31] Bhim Shamsher suspected the plot having been hatched in India and the Gurkha League, of which Thir

Shamsher, Hem Shamsher and many other Rana expatriates were members,[32] having been implicated in it.

In 1931 a group of youngmen, a relative of the king, Tribhuban Bir Bikram Shah Deb,[33] among them, were involved in another conspiracy to violently overthrow the Rana rule and to restore royal power before finally establishing a parliamentary government.[34] Two years later, yet another revolutionary plot was nipped in the bud ; the conspirators were suspected to have brought bombs from Delhi.[35] About this time a book entitled *Makaika kheti* was written by one Krishna Lal. It narrated the miserable plight of Nepalese peasants. In the preface the author deplored that in Nepal foreign dogs were preferred to native dogs without regard to the fact that in providing protection against thieves, the latter were the more useful. It was clearly a commentary on the anglophile policy of the Rana government. Krishna Lal was sent to prison and there he died.[36]

Some Nepali youngmen, who were influenced by the Gandhian philosophy, formed an association to educate the people on the evils of caste system, meat eating and drinking. The Rana government soon came upon them and then their activities stopped. Such, too, was the fate of an attempt by a group of young men to set up a public library at Kathmandu.[37]

In 1935 a political party named Praja Parishad was formed at Kathmandu whose members later suffered capital punishment and life imprisonment for anti-Rana activities. In 1937 a group of educated Nepalis started a modern school at Kathmandu. A social service organisation and a Citizens' Rights Association also came up, with Sukraraj Shastri, a son of Madhabraj Joshi, as their guiding spirit. Sukraraj was a teacher in the State High School at Kathmandu and had earlier met Gandhi in Calcutta.[38] In 1937 he addressed a large public gathering at Kathmandu demanding restoration of royal power and urging the people to oust the Ranas. Sukraraj was put in jail and this, on Yuddha Shamsher's own admission, released "a wave of political cons-

ciousness in Nepal".[39] At this time educated Nepalis wrote in Indian journals a number of articles on the social and economic conditions of their country and welcoming the growth of Nepali nationalism. In 1938 one Pandit Murli Prasad was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for having written an article on the duties of a good ruler which was interpreted by the Ranas as a reflection on the nature of their government.[40]

Bir Shamsher's scheme

If repression was expected to curb the anti-Rana elements in Nepal, threat of social ostracism was the means adopted to prevent the Gurkhas in India from being implicated in political movements. The news in June 1930 of a Garhwali contingent having refused to fire on a political procession at Peshawar increased Bhim Shamsher's fear of similar indiscipline in Gurkha corps.[41] He frankly told the British Envoy :

> What I am most anxious about is that the Gurkhas in British India may become contaminated by their association with or be seduced by Indian malcontents from the right path of associating themselves with their government at home in firm friendship with the British.[42]

He suggested that he should periodically send priests to Darjeeling, Calcutta, Benares and Assam districts ; his ostensible intention was to ensure the observance of caste rules by the local Nepalis ; the real object, however, was to keep an eye on them to prevent any activity against the Ranas and the British government.[43] British Envoys at Kathmandu generally welcomed the idea[43a] but not the Government, for its suspicion that the Rana government might in future make use of these priests as Nepal's consular representatives in India. This would enhance Nepal's political status, a development which the Indian government would not allow.[44]

Besides, a section of British officers did not want the Rana government's influence on the Nepali population in India to increase as was certain to result from Bir Shamsher's scheme.[45] These officers were rather uneasy over the rapid growth of the

Nepali population in the border districts of Bihar and United Provinces. They had noted "signs of national feeling" among the Nepalis in these districts and the north-east frontier areas.[46] A movement was already afoot for a hillmen's college at Kalimpong and for making Nepali the medium of instruction in primary schools of the Darjeeling district as well as the official language in the local courts. Nepalis in Sikkim, Kalimpong, Kurseong, Darjeeling, Goalpara, Darang and Kamrup regarded the King of Nepal as their "national ruler" whose birthday they celebrated in great pomp and ceremony. Among the Nepalis disputes involving caste and religion were settled by the application of theNepalese law and appeals preferred to the Nepalese *darbar*.[47] Even Indian-born traders of Nepalese extraction at Kalimpong while carrying on trade with Tibetans passed themselves off as subjects of Nepal to claim exemptions from duty and other facilities.[48] To prevent any further growth of what they described as the "menace of Gurkhali nationalism", these British officers would check Nepali immigration to India.[49] The influence of the Amirs of Afghanistan on the Pathan tribes on the north-west frontier of India[50] could well have served as a warning against allowing the development of another foreign power's influence on the martial population of the north-east frontier. Besides, as was pointed out by an officer at the India Office,

> even without any question of hostility to the British government, an extensive Nepalese organisation in India might take a difficult aspect in the event of India becoming self-governing.[51]

However, if Bhim Shamsher's scheme could be implemented by his many unofficial agents in Nepalese colonies in India, the British government would have no objection.[52]

The Rana Economic Projects

It was not long before the Rana government realised that repression could only scotch the anti-Rana feelings in Nepal,

not kill them. And this drove the government to undertake some economic development of the country which could alone assuage the peoples' discontent. It was, in fact, the economic insecurity in the country that had been driving the Nepalese to India where, as Bhim Shamsher put it, they fell an easy victim to "the virus of the Swarajist movement".[53]

Both Bhim Shamsher and Yuddha Shamsher undertook some modest economic projects. The Indian government was also requested to take measures for the improvement of the economic condition of the Nepalese in India. In May 1932, while on a state visit to India, Bhim Shamsher received a Nepali deputation which urged him to press its demands on the British government. The deputationists demanded opportunities for more government jobs for the Nepalis in India, more promotion to higher ranks of the army, the establishment of a chair in Nepali at the Calcutta University and financial aid to Nepali students at Darjeeling for higher education.[54]

Bhim Shamsher encouraged cotton cultivation in the Tarai and the production of home-spun cloth by *charkha* (the spinning wheel)[55]—a measure which led some British officers to even wonder if the Rana government had come under the influence of Gandhi's economic ideas.[56] Yuddha Shamsher set up an administrative reforms committee and undertook a modest industrialisation programme. Jute and cotton mills were established in the Tarai ; also a match and a sugar factory there. Industrial exhibitions were held to encourage manufacturers. The establishment of a bank,[57] a number of co-operative societies, a Board for the development of cottage industries and a training centre for the manufacture of handloom fabrics were some other measures.[58]

Land laws were revised and land revenue of Rupees eighty-five lakhs remitted. An ambitious scheme was laid out to reclaim marshy, pestilential lands in the Tarai. The scheme, which provided for the distribution of rent-free land,[58a] was intended to attract not only the hundreds of retired Gurkha soldiers in India but all the :

> Nepalese flotsam and jetsam thrown up by world-wide economic blizzard which might otherwise be sucked into the whirpool of revolutionary movements in India and so involve their mother country in difficulties.[53b]

The British Envoy shared the Rana government's fond expectation that the scheme would "to some extent combat the activities of the All India Gurkha League" which had been using Nepal's economic backwardness and Nepalese migration to India as a grist to its propaganda mill. The scheme would also enable the Rana government to retain its hold on "that floating part of the Nepali population which tends to drift away" from it and swell the ranks of the anti-Rana elements in India.[59]

Duties on salt and cotton were abolished and certain octroi duties on small traders as well ; taxes were lightened on pasturage. A new scheme for the generation of electricity followed and an automatic telephone system was set up. For the army personnel a provident fund was created and the age of retirement for the rank and file was fixed at fortyfive and for officers at sixty. On the eve of the second world war, Yuddha Shamsher announced a twenty-year plan for the economic development of the state but took no step to implement it.[60]

Raising the age of marriage and the abolition of capital punishment as an experimental measure for five years were two more important reforms undertaken b y Yuddha Shamsher.[61]

The Rana Economic Policy

However, all these reforms fell far short of popular expectations. Belated as they were, they did no more than scrape the surface of the economic problems of the state. In fact, the Ranas never wanted extensive economic development of the state they believed that improved economic standard of the people and their abject submission to authority had an inverse relationship.

Nor was any appreaciable economic growth possible under the Rana administration. Concentration of economic and

political powers in the hands of a family whose only motive was to preserve its wealth and interests inhibited any economic progress. Under the Rana economic system the entire revenue of the state[62] was treated as the ruling Prime Minister's personal income ; the death of the Prime Minister involved, in consequence, the emptiness of the treasury, so that periodically the administration started with no money at all. The progress of the country depended entirely on the whims of the ruling Prime Minister and the amount of money he had been able to keep for the purpose.[63]

But then, there is no denying the fact that large scale economic development of a country with an extremely hilly terrain was an enormously expensive undertaking for a government with an annual revenue of less than thirty-five million rupees and an inelastic revenue structure. Taxation was an unpopular measure ; it would hit the poor hard, for the vested interests of the nobility ; both lay and ecclesiastical, in the form of freeholds could not be touched. Technical knowhow was unavailable in the country, while too much dependence on the British for the economic development of the state was politically undesirable.[64] The maintenance of a large standing army—45,000 strong[65]—also put a heavy strain on the state revenue.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 7622/1929, 855/1930.
2. At the death of Chandra Shamsher, the Rana family had over 380 male members, constituting "a serious problem, socially, politically and economically". IFP. (Ext.-Sec), File No. 21/1928.
3. PSL, D 187 : Leading Personages in Nepal, 1922.
4. The extra-territoral previleges enjoyed by the Nepalese in Tibet under the 1856 treaty constituted a cause of ill-feelings between the two countries. The Tibetan government often disputed the claim of jurisdiction over Nepalese nationals by Kathmandu's political agent at Lhasa. In 1929 a person, claimed to be a Nepali by the

agent, was forced out of the Nepalese legation by the Tibetan authorities. The Dalai Lama having refused to apologise for the incident, Kathmandu made military preparations. A war being very likely, the Indian government sent to Lhasa a special envoy who succeeded in persuading the Dalai Lama to make salisfactory amends to Kathmandu. Col. Daukes, the British Envoy at Kathmandu, exerted his pressure on the Rana government. And then the crisis passed off. IFP. (Ext-Sec), File No. 279/1930. Richardson, op.cit., p. 133.

5. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 228/1929. EC, 21-18 : Reg.No. 855/1930.
6. He was the youngest surviving brother of Chandra Shamsher.
7. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No, 6590/1932, Daukes to Metcalfe, 15 Sept. 1932. Also, Reg. Nos. 5334, 5393/1932.
8. Leading Personages in Nepal, 1922, op.cit.
9. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 6664/1939, Betham, Minister at Kathmandu, to Caroe, 17 Aug. 1939.
10. Leading Personages, 1922, op.cit.
11. Betham wrote on Padma Shamsher : He is "an extremely nice man and I think would be a benevolent ruler . . . Unlike the majority of the Rana family, he has not got a large family." EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 6664/1939, Betham to Caroe, 17 Aug. 1939.

    ". . . his house is in a state of great dilapidation ; he wears shabby clothes and as a rule carpet slippers on all possible occasions. This contrasts very noticeably with other exceedingly well-dressed and bejewelled Ranas". Ibid. : Reg. No. 4862/1940, Betham to Lord Halifax, 27 July 1940.
12. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 6664/1939.
13. Leading Personages, 1922, op. cit.
14. EC, 21-6 : 6664/1939, 4862/1940.
15. Satish Kumar, op, cit., pp. 64-77.
16. IFP. Sept. 1879, Nos. 386-90, KW, No. 1 : C. Girdlestone, Resident, to A. C. Lyall, Foreign Secretary, 5 May 1879. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 1949/1934.
17. EC, 21-5 : Nepal, General Publications, Who is Who in Nepal, 1949.
18. IFP (Ext-Sec). File No. 21/1928,
19. Ibid.
20. Ranuddip succeeded Jang Bahadur in 1877. Bir Shamsher was his nephew (son of Ranuddip's brother, Dhir Shamsher). See my book, op, cit., pp. 40-41.
21. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928.
22. Ibid, File No. 401/1925. EC, 21-18 : Reg. Nos. 4222/1925, 1511/1926.
23. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 25/1931.
24. EC, 21-18 : Reg. Nos. 2011, 1949, 2765/1934.

25. It was Chandra Shamsher who had divided the scions of the Rana family into three categories : 'A' Ranas, 'B' Ranas and 'C' Ranas. 'A' Ranas were the progenies of wives with whom high caste Kshattriyas could interdine ; 'B' Ranas were those born of wives with whom all social intercourse was allowed except the partaking of boiled rice : 'C' Ranas were those born of mistresses. 'B' and 'C' Ranas were associated with the lower echelons of government while being debarred from higher offices. They could rise not above the rank of Colonel and Major respectively while 'A' Ranas became Lt. Colonels at their birth, all the high military and civil offices, including the Prime MInistership, being their exclusive preserve. Leo Rose and Margaret Fisher, *The Politics of Nepal* (New York, 1970), pp. 23-5.
26. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 6330/1940.
27. Satish Kumar, op cit., pp. 45-61.
28. Jang Bahadur's three daughters and a son were married in the royal family. Daniel Wright, *History of Nepal*, p. 68, Bir Shamsher's daughters were married to the King. F.O. 766/3. Three sons of Chandra Shamsher were married to royal princesses. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928.
29. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 5426/1932, Note by J. C. Walton, Political Secretary, 8 Sept. 1932. EC, 21-51 : Reg. No. 1690/1938. The British Envoy reported that the Ranas always feared the resumption of power by the King as "an ultimate possibility", although "an extremely remote one". IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 92/1929,
30. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 1701, 3181/1932, 1494, 3757/1932.
30a. He was the only son of Padma Shamsher.
31. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 4291, 5610/1930, 5831/1931, 80/1932.
32. EC, 21-2 ; Reg. Nos. 1246/1932.
33. Born in 1906 : ascended the throne in 1911 ; died in 1955.
34. HPP : File No. 232/1931. EC, 21-2 : Reg. Nos. 5831, 6012/1931.
35. Ibid. : Reg. Nos. 3181/1932, 5057/1933.
36. Balchandra Sharma, op. cit., p. 355.
37. Regmi, op. cit., p. 167.
38. Ibid. p. 172. HPP : File No. 33-66/1942.
39. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 6986/1940, Betham to Government, 4 Nov. 1940.
40. Regmi, op. cit., p. 19.
41. HPP : File No. 14-9/1931.
42. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 5610/1930, Bhim Shamsher to Wilkinson, Envoy.
43. Ibid. : Reg. Nos. 7635, 7875/1930.
43a. Ibid. : Reg. No. 5610/1930. Daukes to Government, 3 July 1930.
44. See Chapter I, fn. 81. Shortly hereafter, however, in 1933, Daman

Shamsher was appointed Nepal's first Consul-General in New Delhi. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 463/1933.

45. EC, 21-2 : Reg. Nos. 5610. 7635, 7875/1930.
46. According to the 1921 census, there were 54,535 Nepalis in Sikkim out of a population of 81,721. In the Darjeeling and Kalimpong districts of Bengal, the Nepalis constituted also 60 per cent of the population and in Assam districts 7.1 per cent. There used to be considerable influx of Nepalis in Indian border districts as casual farm labourers during the harvesting season. EC. 21-2 : Reg, No. 3298/1930. The 1931 census put the number of Nepali immigrants to India at 327, 028. J. H. Hutton, *Census of India*, 1931, Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 76. J. T, Marten, *Census of India*, 1921, Vol. I, Pt. I, pp. 95-6.
47. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 3298/1930, In the Gurkha regiments in India. Nepalese caste rules and social regulations operated. There were regimental *pandits* and *panchayats* of Gurkha officers. Difficult social cases were referred to appropriate authorities in Nepal. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No, 7875/1930.
48. Under the treaty of 1856, the Nepalese obtained the right to duty-free trade in Tibet. See my article, "Nepal-Tibet War, 1855-56", *JUSI*, Apr-June 1964, pp. 175-94. Aitchison, II, op.cit., pp. 97-100, fn.
49. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 3298/1930.
50. C. C. Davies, "The North-West Frontier, 1843-1918" in H. H. Dodwell, *The Cambridge History of India*, VI, pp. 460-63.
51. EC, 21-2 ; Reg. No. 5610/1930, Note by Wakely, 20 Sept. 1930. However, the Envoy saw nothing but good in the continuing links of the domiciled Nepalese in India with their country of their origin : "The call of their own country, the name of the Maharaja and the ties—even though distant—of their kith and kin exercise an appeal which could possibly be put to good use". Ibid., Daukes to Government, 3 July 1930.
52. Ibid., Dept. Note.
53. Ibid.
54. EC, 21-2 : Reg. No. 1946/1932.
55. In fact the scheme was launched by Chandra Shamsher who sent one Tulsi Meher on a state scholarship to Gandhi's *ashram* at Sabarmati for training in setting up cottage industries. Chandra Shamsher's object was to divert the attention of Nepalese youngmen from revolutionary politics. Chandra Shamsher set up an institution, Charkha Guthi, to popularise khadi and village industries in Nepal. Later, Tulsi Meher was punished by Chandra when his reformist zeal alarmed the latter. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 272/1930. Bhattacharjee, op. cit., p. 21.

56. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 272/1930.
57. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 5089/1934. *The Modern Review*, Feb. 1933, pp. 253-54 ; September 1939, pp. 281-83 ; November 1939, pp. 577-82. IFP, (Ext), File No. 291/1936.
58. *The Modern Review*, September 1934. pp. 310-13 ; November 1939, pp. 577-82.
58a. EC. 21-2 : Reg. Nos. 1946. 2377/1932.
58b. Ibid. : Reg. No. 3415/1933, Daukes to Government, 8 Mar 1933.
59. Ibid. : Reg. No. 1946/1932. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 3415/1933, Daukes to Government, 14 Mar, 1933. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 24/1931.
60. *The Modern Review*, February 1933, pp. 253-54 ; Septembhr 1934, pp. 310-13 ; September 1939, pp. 281-83 ; November 1939, pp. 577-82 ; September 1941, pp. 250-59. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 5089/1934 ; 21-19 : Reg. No. 6873/1932.
61. Ibid. ; Reg. Nos. 6873/1932, 32/1933. IFP (Ext-Sec). File No. 238/1931. *The Modern Review*, June 1933, p. 732.
62. The revenue was estimated by the British Minister at about $3\frac{1}{2}$ crore of rupees. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 3358/1939.
63. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 4862/1940.
64. Patrick Balfour (*Grand Tour, Diary of an Eastern Journey*, P. 169) who visited Nepal in 1934, saw only one English engineer at Kathmandu engaged by the Rana government to build bridges and set up electrification projects.
65. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 8124/1933.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Last Phase, 1939-47

Anti-Rana Movement in Nepal intensified

Nothing availed to stem the rot that had set in the Rana body-politic. Dissensions in the Rana family showed no signs of abatement, and as for opposition to the Rana regime, it was no longer a mere feeling ; it soon became a force to reckon with. With the years political consciousness in the younger generation of the Nepalese bred in them a desire for some participation in the government with a view to having, in particular, some say in the expenditure of public money. The contrast between the apalling poverty of the masses and the ostentatious living of the Ranas galled the enlightened Nepalese.[1]

Besides, even the little economic development that had taken place produced the natural result : increased communication with India and freer importation of advanced political ideas into Nepal. Bahadur Shamsher deplored the construction of the Nepal State Railway :

> People were moving backwards and forwards between India and Nepal and mixing with all sorts of undesirable elements in India.

Betham's advice that "communication spells progress and isolation is a retrograde step" failed to reassure him.[2]

Meanwhile attempts to overthrow the Rana regime continued ; they were now no more conspiracies hatched by a few desperate men ; they had become the part of a revolutionary popular movement linked more closely than ever with the nationalist movement in India. Prominent Indian leaders like Jai Prakash Narain and Rammanohar Lohia were closely implicated in the Indian-based anti-Rana movement ; they worked hand in hand with B. P. Koirala, D. R. Regmi and other young Nepali leaders.[3] Pamphlets and placards bearing

the name of the Praja Parishad and scathingly denouncing the Rana regime made their appearance at Kathmandu and Birganj, a town in the Nepalese Tarai. The Praja Parishad gave a call to the people to join the anti-Rana movement. A number of persons at Kathmandu received a circular from Kanpur urging them to join a revolutionary organisation, called the *Raktapat* committee, which claimed support of the Japanese government.[4]

In 1940 the anti-Rana elements made a determined bid to destroy the Ranas and restore the king to power whose complicity in the conspiracy was definitely established.[5] All the important members of the Rana family were to have been massacred on the *Diwali* day while making their customary presents to the king ; should the scheme fail, the king would take them to his private cinema hall for a movie show and then leave them there to be blown up by explosives manufactured in Nepal by some Indian revolutionaries. Several Nepalis at Benares, Calcutta, Patna, Kanpur and Almora, working in close concert with Indian socialist leaders and the Praja Parishad, were actively implicated in the plot. The plan was to sow disaffection in the people of Kathmandu, mostly of the Newar stock, and then in those of the district headquarters before carrying the agitation against the Rana government to the villages. The conspirators would have tampered with the Nepalese state army and Gurkha corps in India as well. Their ultimate object was to establish a republican government which would take measures for the development of education, communication and industry in the country.[6]

The plot was detected in time. Forty-three persons were rounded up. Of them five were hanged in full public view[7] ; two Brahmin accomplices were publicly disgraced and the rest either given long terms of imprisonment or banished from the country—and all this despite Betham's warnings that such drastic measures would spark off strong public reaction.[8] British intelligence reports had it that Yuddha Shamsher's plan of replacing the king by one of his sons married to the Prime

Minister's grand daughter failed when the young man refused to succumb to his pressure .[9]

The brutal punisments far from smothering the anti-Rana feelings exacerbated them. Large crowds gathered to view the dead bodies strung up by wayside streets ; many were observed paying surreptitiously homage to the dead bodies. Placards bobbed up, vowing vengeance on the perpetrators of the gruesome act and, suggestively, one day Yuddha Shamsher's statue at Kathmandu was found draped in a blood-soaked cloth. Betham noticed many a sullen and grim face at Kathmandu.[9a] Intelligence reports convinced him that the incident had created a tense situation and that the simmering public anger might explode in desperate attempts on the life of the Prime Minister :

> there is undoubtedly a very strong feeling in the central valley against not only the Maharaja[10] but against the Rana regime . . . that a serious upheaval (even confined to the valley) is not necessarily imminent, but is bound to come some time.[11]

Restiveness in the military tribes

In fact, public resentment had assumed a far wider base than heretofore ; not only the small educated elite of Kathmandu, its Newar population[12] and the royal family, but even the military tribes of Nepal, forming nearly eighty per cent of the country's population, were restive. The tribesmen grudged that the Rana government had provided them with no modern amenities whatever ; there were no schools in the hill country, no hospitals either ; the hill areas being nearly eighty per cent of the country's land surface, was far poorer than the central valley[13] and the Tarai. At Kathmandu the Nepalese state army was sore that while the Prime Minister had exempted the civilian population from the repayment of a large amount of money given to them as a loan after the disastrous earthquake in 1934,[14] no such exemption had been given to the military personnel.[15]

In January 1941, the men of the second battalion of the Nepalese contingent, doing garrison duty at Kohat in the North-West Frontier Province, broke into revolt against their officers following a dispute over the payment of ration allowances. The Government of India took a very serious view of the incident[16] ; to them it looked as "a symptom of dislike of population for Rana influence which supplies majority of officers"[17] to the Nepalese state army. All precautionary measures were taken to prevent the mutinous spirit in other corps. The ring leaders were arrested and sent away to Nepal for trial ; almost all the officers of the unit returned to Nepal ; the unit was then reformed with British officers in command.[18]

British reaction to the anti-Rana Movement

It was genuine concern rather than mere watchful interest with which the British government viewed the course of corrosion in the Rana family and the growing popular pressure on the Rana government for liberalisation ; both boded political instability at Kathmandu. With Chandra Shamsher's death it seemed as though the British government would have to make a reassessment of its relations with Nepal. Chandra Shamsher was for the British the model Prime Minister of Nepal : educated enough[19] to be dealt with on a personal level ; convinced of the value of the British alliance ; resistant to change in the status quo ; and wielding unchallengeable authority in the state. In his hands British interests in Nepal were safe. His long rule and unwavering friendship had given the British a sense of security and his state, their confidence and support. Both could be affected by his death.

None of Chandra Shamsher's immediate successors seemed as strong as he and so hardly as dependable. They needed British assistance in a far greater measure and yet they were not the less sensitive to any derogation to their position as a result of the assistance. Assailed by hostile forces, they sought to look strong by a policy of pressure on New Delhi ; they suceeded only in irritating it.

Even the younger Ranas seemed to the British no better ; some of them were educated no doubt, but lacked experience, and, therefore, they would either succumb to the wind of change or themselves welcome it.[20] In any case, Nepal after Chandra Shamsher would not be the same again. Expressing this premonition, the British Envoy warned the Government :

> We should be prepared for both her [Nepal's] domestic and foreign policies becoming less simple with the removal of his [Chandra Shamsher's] restraining force and the passing of power to younger hands more susceptible to criticism and the influence of modern ideas and example.[20a]

Lt. Colonel T. H. Keynes, in his report on Nepal, expressed the same feeling and sounded the same warning :

> the identity of the rulers of Nepal in the near future is open to much doubt.[21]

And this at a time when an actively friendly Nepal was of the utmost importance to the British to meet the challenge of Indian nationalism. Protagonists of militant Hinduism, in particular, looked to Nepal as a *Point d' appui* outside India[22] just as Muslim nationalists in India drew inspiration from the Pan-Islamic movement in countries to the north and west of Afghanistan. Chandra Shamsher had been successful in "sterilising the Hindu stream of pilgrims and keeping his country outside the Hindu movement".[23] In fact the situation had come to such a pass that :

> putting aside the prospect of an actually hostile Nepal which might well tilt the scale against us, even an indifferent Nepal would be a disaster.[24]

And if the Ranas continued to fight among themselves, this indifference could naturally be expected by the British government.

Bhim Shamsher's was too short a rule to have any impact on British relations with Nepal.[25] As for Yuddha Shamsher New Delhi was not quite happy with him. He became increasingly fidgetty and sulky in nature. He craved for British

honours and titles whereby to impress his people that his stock with the British government was as high as Chandra's had been and so he was as much certain of their support in his need. The eagerness with which he received the Chinese, Italian, German and French titles was also noted by the British, but more in a spirit of amusement than concern[26] : he was evidently desperately trying to salvage his image at home by these foreign titles which he could claim none of his predecessors had had.[27] He made Nepal's representation at the court of St. James a prestige issue for him and by relentless pressure wrung New Delhi's acquiescence.[28] The same pressure tactics was applied in a vain effort to settle the outstanding issue of capitalisation of the annual subsidy and cession of land. Nor did the British government quite welcome Yuddha Shamsher's eagerness to go to London as a state guest. Such trips by Nepalese dignitaries had been far from a happy experience for the British government, although yielding much political dividend.[29] Yuddha Shamsher, for his part, was none too happy with New Delhi's measures to stop anti-Rana propaganda in the Indian press[30] nor with those to prevent conspiracies by the emigre Ranas in India.[31] He would not agree with the British Envoy that the latter's government could not muzzle the press entirely[32] ; and as for the Rana emigres, the British policy was :

> We maintain an attitude of neutrality between the refugees and the party in power. We do not surrender the former, but we prevent them, so far as possible, from intriguing against the Nepalese government. We do not require the Nepalese government to give them allowances, but we bring forward their claims when opportunity occurs. We do not recognise any claim on their part to allowances.[33]

This to Yuddha Shamsher was an unduly soft policy. He wanted the extradition of his political enemies, and the Indian government's refusal to oblige him caused him worry.

Of the unpopularity of the Rana regime, the British government had full knowledge and of Yuddha Shamsher's inability

to deal with the deepening political crisis, they were convinced. Tension intensified in the last years of his rule ; old and senile, "thoroughly disgusted and exasperated by political agitation" against his rule, he even preferred retirement to clinging insecurely to power. The huge fortune he had made as the Prime Minister would ensure him a comfortable life in retirement. But his son, Bahadur Shamsher, would not allow him to retire—not until he had assumed power himself. Bahadur was "hot-headed and unbalanced" with "scant brain power or political ability". His swaggering manners and assumption of *de facto* power during his father's illness and infirmity made him "cordially disliked and practically friendless" in the *darbar*. It was certain that if he assumed power as the Prime Minister in supersession of the stronger claims of his elder cousins, the sons of Chandra Shamsher, the latter would oppose him and, very likely, with violence.[34]

The British view of political change in Nepal

Intelligence reports from the Nepalese capital left the British government in no doubt that until the wishes of the educated Nepalese for a more constitutional form of government were met, the agitation against the Rana regime would not cease. But then, such a form of government did not seem possible and far less desirable to the British. With less than two per cent of the people being just able to read and write, and this literacy confined to a few urban centres only, a country-wide popular government based on an electoral system was an impracticable proposition. At the most, in Betham's opinion, elected municipal councils could be set up at Kathmandu, Bhatgaon, Patan and Birganj to assuage the feelings of the local elite.[35] The Rana regime, an autocratic family oligarchy, firmly attached to the British government and dependent on it, was viewed by the latter as "the sanest form of government"[36] and, from the point of view of British interests in the country, the best as well. Betham made it clear :

> From the point of view of the British and Indian governments, I am not sure that this political consciousness [as seen by him in Nepal] is in every respect desirable. I feel that with one person to deal with, who is anxious for his own advantage to keep on good terms with the Government of India, the active assistance which we have received in the past is more likely to be forthcoming than with a more constitutional form of government, especially on the lines of the Congress ministries that are now in power in certain of the provinces in India.[37]

At the India Office, however, the general feeling was that some liberalisation of the Rana regime was desirable in the interests of domestic stability at Kathmandu. Some accommodation on the part of Yuddha Shamsher with the forces of change was deemed politically expedient as well.[38] But then, to suggest anything to him in this regard was certain to give him offence.

Besides, soon the second World War broke out when, for the sake of uninterrupted supply of Gurkha recruits, the British government could desire no change in the status quo at Kathmandu. During the war the British policy was to keep Yuddha Shamsher in good humour. He supplied about one hundred fifty thousand Gurkha recruits for the Indian army besides more than fifty thousand men for the Indian military police. Further, as during the first world war, contingents from the Nepalese state army were loaned to do garrison duty on the north-west frontier and to strengthen the wartime internal security arrangements in India[39]. It was hoped that the Nepalese soldiers would exert "a very powerful and sedative influence" on anti-British elements in India.[40]

In fact, in such a contingency the British government wanted Yuddha Shamsher to at least "last out the war"[41] and then Chandra Shamsher's sons would certainly clinch power. As for Padma Shamsher, even if he succeeded Yuddha, he would have but a very brief tenure when he would be

content to play second fiddle to the eldest son of Chandra Shamsher, the masterful Mohan Shamsher.[42] Betham held the sons of Chandra in high esteem. He expected them to effectively deal with the anti-Rana agitation by a policy of carrot and stick. The three elder sons of Chandra Shamsher were educated and cultured and so were better able to appreciate the needs of the changing times ; they were united, strong-willed, popular in the army and so could withstand pressures for change in any direction other than what they themselves considered necessary. They were enormously rich—their father having left them fortyone million rupees—and so unlikely to continue the established practice of using the public revenue for private purposes. They were even expected by Betham to give the King greater freedom of movement, if not a share in the administration of the country ; and this would modify the bitterness in the royal family. Betham hoped that a liberal rule would be established by Chandra Shamsher's sons and a friendlier one, too, for they were the most anglophile section in the Rana family. It was, therefore, not without reason that the change in the roll of succession in 1934 had been viewed by the British Minister as a move in the right direction.[43] Betham conveyed to Government his high hopes of a better regime in Nepal under the sons of Chandra ;

> .....progress will be visible .....treasury will not be emptied on the death of a Prime Minister. Communication will be improved ; education and medical amenities will spread to outlying districts. Industrialisation, exploitation of mineral resources of the country, fostering of village industries etc. will have their places. In short, Nepal will progress and many of the improvements, which the 'people' may now start claiming for, will appear of their own accord.[44]

Events, however, proved Betham a false prophet. Education, strong family attachment, strength of character and administrative ability were poor substitutes for enlightenment, vision and pragmatism. With all their virtues, Chandra

Shamsher's sons failed to see the writing on the wall. They continued the repressive policy which only accelerated the decline of the Rana regime. And as for Betham, it was not without reason that Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, rated him low as an officer[45]; he was, indeed, a poor judge of men and events.

Policy of strengthening Yuddha's position

Meanwhile the Indian government took all means to bolster Yuddha Shamsher's position. He was assisted in his industrialisation projects which, in relieving the unemployment problem to an extent, was expected to take the sting off the anti-Rana agitation.[46] The Ranas were expected to invest their enormous wealth in the newly established Nepalese industries instead of, as hitherto, in business enterprises in India—a practice justly condemned by the enlightened Nepalese.[47]

However, when Yuddha Shamsher wanted the Nepalese manufactured goods to enter Indian markets free of customs duty, the Indian government raised objections. So it did to another proposal of Yuddha Shamsher that he would levy a countervailing excise duty on Indian exports to Nepal as a protective measure for the Nepalese industries. New Delhi found in both the proposals considerable financial loss to the Indian government. On account of the low rate of taxation in Nepal, low wages to labourers and the absence of any factory legislation, restricting hours of work in Nepalese factories, they could turn out goods far more cheaply than Indian manufacturing establishments ; hence there was the fear of Nepalese goods being smuggled into Indian markets. The nationalist press in India already critical of British policy towards the Rana regime, was certain to condemn any economic policy which favoured the Nepalese interests at the cost of those of India. Nor could the Indian government ignore the possibility of Indian capitalists investing in Nepalese industries just across the Indian border with a view to avoiding taxes at home. New Delhi was clearly :

opposed to any concession unsound in fiscal principle leading to unnatural stimulation of industry in Nepal.[48]

But not so London. It was in favour of acquiescence in Yuddha Shamsher's proposals and that because of pressing political considerations ; if the British did not help in Nepal's industrialisation scheme, they might lose their exclusive economic hold on the country, and other countries, particularly Japan, might take advantage of it. Japanese goods had already made their appearance at Kathmandu and other places in Nepal whence they were being smuggled into India. Yuddha Shamsher was even keen on engaging Japanese technical experts and sending Nepalese youngmen to Japan for industrial training[48a] The Japanese government too was no less eager to forge relations with Kathmandu and, as a first step towards the object, it had expressed its keenness to confer titles on the Nepalese Prime Minister. In sush circumstances, the Secretary of State urged the Viceroy :

> Whether present Maharaja remains or not, His Majesty's Government feel strongly that on political grounds it is most important to make special effort to satisfy Nepalese government's wishes in the economic sphere before it is too late, both in order to ensure continuation of their present goodwill and on account of future risk that, if present opportunity of rendering effective help to Nepal is missed, Nepalese government may, in consequence, decide after the war to turn elsewhere (for example to Japan) for necessary foreign assistance in economic development. Experience elsewhere (for example, Thailand) has shown that Japanese would not be slow to take advantage of such a situation to detriment of both Indian and imperial interests.[49]

The British image at Kathmandu had somehow to be kept up when the run of reverses in the war at German and Japanese hands had already tarnished it. Many in the Rana family were, indeed, pessimistic about the British victory in the war. Even Yuddha Shamsher, who, according to Betham, had so

long been confident of British success, was shaken when France capitulated.[50] At Kathmandu the exchange rate of the Indian rupee had a sharp fall[51] ; people made a run on the Nepal State Bank to dispose of their Indian currency notes.[52]. In such circumstances, London advised New Delhi to :

> make some financial sacrifice in order to maintain Nepalese goodwill and prevent Nepal falling under the influence of Japan.[53]

New Delhi took stringent measures to deal with the anti-Rana activities in India. *Janata, Naya Hindustan, Darbar* and several other newspapers of the United Provinces were warned against condemning the Rana regime.[54] Prominent Indian socialist leaders having links with the Praja Parishad were closely watched ; and a secret censorship was imposed on all private correspondence to and from Nepal.[54a] But despite Yuddha Shamsher's insistence, the British government did not extradite Nepali political agitators in India ; and this the Prime Minister took to heart.[55]

Nepal and the Quit India Movement, 1942

During the Quit India movement political agitation in India assumed an unprecedented magnitude[56] ; communication links between India and Nepal through Bihar districts remained snapped for several weeks.[56a] Yudda Shamsher was worried over the virtual breakdown of the British administration in the border districts when "the Congress elements and *goondas* (law breakers) might inflitrate into Nepal". He even charged the Indian government with indifference to Nepal's security which had been endangered by the Congress activity.[57]

After the movement was suppressed in India, hundreds of Congressmen crossed over the Nepalese Tarai ; and for their extradition New Delhi had to exert considerable pressure on Kathmandu.[57a] Betham warned Yuddha Shamsher ;

> the presence of these fugitives from justice in Nepal cannot but cause political upheaval in Nepal, because

> these men are political minded in a way which can be harmful both to your Highness' government and to the Government of India.[58]

This worked. Meanwhile, the people of Saptari in the Tarai had broken open the Hanumannagar jail and set several Indian political internees free—Jayprakash Narayan and Rammonohar Lohia among them.[59] The warning of Betham had proved true. Hereafter Kathmandu co-operated with New Delhi in the latter's mopping up operation in the Tarai and the result was that out of the 490 wanted Congressmen as many as 465 could be captured.[60]

It is hard to explain why the Nepalese government was not helpful when the Indian government first sought its co-operation in hunting out the Congress refugees in the Nepalese territory. Possibly it was Yuddha Shamsher's retaliation to the British policy of non-extradition of the politically active Nepalese to Kathmandu ; or, as London imagined, it was indicative of his new policy of playing soft with the Congress party—the party, he well knew, would hold power in the post-war political set up in India. The India Office noted :

> . . . the Nepalese government were probably reluctant to alienate the Congress party in view of our publicly expressed policy to bring our control of India to a rapid end and the likelihood that when we go, the Congress party will be the rulers of that part of India which borders on Nepal.[61]

Besides, the police in the bordering districts of Bihar and the United Provinces failed to furnish the Nepalese border officials with names of the offenders and the nature of their offences. The Nepalese border police was inefficient and as for the Indian police, Yuddha Shamsher had strong doubts on their "reliability, loyalty and corruptibility." In fact, the plan of the mopping up operation by the Nepalese and British police had leaked out before its implementation and so the scheme had fallen through for a time,[62] leaving a trail of misunderstanding and bitterness between the two governments.

The Last Phase : The end of the Rana rule

Political scene in India changed fast after the second World War and with it changed in like pace that at Kathmandu. The Rana government had to make significant policy adjustment to the new situation created by the British withdrawal from India and the assumption of power by the Congress party. The Ranas adopted an attitude of accommodation with the new Government of India.[63]

New Delhi wanted the Ranas to liberalise their regime to stave off a large scale internal disturbance and even exerted pressure on them for the purpose. Inside Nepal pressure on the Rana regime had fast built up in the last years of the war. After the war, the problem arose of rehabilitating the two lakh disbanded Gurkha soldiers—men who could well be fuses for political discontent in the country. There were also signs of disaffection in a section of the Nepalese state army. Two young officers, Colonel Tarun Shamsher and Colonel Nava Vikram Rana, for instance, were caught implicated in a plot to spread anti-Rana feelings in the army and acting under the direction of Subarna Shamsher, a prominent emigre Rana in Calcutta.[64] Anti-Rana Nepalis in India now carried on their activities openly, receiving assistance and encouragement from prominent Indian leaders, including members of the Indian cabinet.[65]

In 1946, B. P. Koirala[66] in a press release from Patna predicted an inevitable political change in Nepal following the emergence of an independent India. He took the initiative in forming a new political party, called the Nepali National Congress with its pledge to help the Indian people achieve complete national independence ; he held that the problems of India and Nepal "were identical and one". The party was determined to launch a non-violent movement in Nepal to replace the Rana regime by a constitutional monarchy. The party at its Calcutta session in January 1947 received complimentary messages from such notable Indian leaders as Acharya Kripalani,

Vijay Laxmi Pandit, Jayprakash Narayan, Rammanohar Lohia and Acharya Narendra Deva. In March the Nepali National Congress launched a *satyagraha* in support of the striking mill workers at Biratnagar, a town in the Nepalese Tarai, which created an unprecedented political excitement in Nepal. The Congress Socialist Party in India supported the Biratnagar strikers.[67]

The strike was called off and the *satyagraha*, too, when the Nepali leaders were assured of constitutional reforms by Padma Shamsher, who had taken over from Yuddha Shamsher when he abdicated in 1945. In June 1947, an election to the Kathmandu municipality was held—"the first experiment in democratic methods in Nepalese history".[68] Then, as a concession to the anti-Rana elements both in Nepal and India and as a gesture of accommodation with the Government of India, insistent on political change, Padma Shamsher announced in Janunry 1948 the first constitution of Nepal. It provided for a Council of Ministers, a bi-cameral legislature, an independent judiciary, village councils and fundamental rights for the people. The constitution incorporated much of the recommendations of a three-man Indian advisory delegation to Kathmandu, headed by Sri Prakasa. The despatch of the delegation by the Indian government under Jawaharlal Nehru clearly suggested its keenness to help Nepal change its traditional political structure into a modern one—the change to be effected both gradually and peacefully.[69]

There were already signs of change at Kathmandu. In a striking reversal of the country's traditional policy of self-isolation, the Rana government widened its diplomatic relations. The Nepalese mission in London was upgraded to an Embassy ; diplomatic relations were established with Washington and a misson was sent to the capital of China, Nanking. Nepal took part in the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947, suggesting its readiness to play a role in the changing political scene in Asia.[70]

Mohan Shamsher : The Last Rana Prime Minister

All this proved Padma Samsher's undoing. His policy of accommodation with the forces demanding change was bitterly opposed by the die-hard Ranas who, led by Mohan Shamsher, forced him to abdicate in February 1948.[71] Mohan Shamsher's policy of resistance to change and repression of elements demanding liberalisation of administration reinforced the anti-Rana movement, obliging the Government of India to intervene—and the intervention proved decisive.

Mohan Shamsher started off with a policy of further widening Nepal's relations with international powers and keeping New Delhi in good humour. In May 1948 in a major foreign policy pronouncement he said :

> Our relations with India, a big country which has emerged through independence, should be neighbourly and as between two sisters. Such a pure and friendly relationship had existed and it will always be our effort to strengthen it and make it more happy. . . . In the present times, it is neither wise nor possible for any country to remain completely detached from the world-wide developments. Therefore, we have also adopted the policy of searching friends and establishing diplomatic contacts with various countries.[72]

He was eager to forge friendly relations with China, Tibet, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. In 1949, Nepal opened its consulate in Burma ; earlier it had sent a delegation to take part in the celebrations to mark Ceylon's independence. In May 1949, the Brazilian Minister and the Australian High Commissioner in India paid goodwill visits to Kathmandu. Nepal applied for admission to the United Nations ; but on account of the Russian opposition, the application failed. However, it secured membership of several agencies of the United Nations such as the IFO, ILO and WHO.[73]

In 1948-49 Mohan Shamsher lent military assistance to New Delhi in dealing with the crisis in Hyderabad and Kashmir.[74]

But his hope of relief from New Delhi's pressure for political reforms remained unrealised.

New Delhi's Policy

Shortly hereafter, the Chinese communist activity in Tibet followed by the 'liberation' of the country lent an urgency to the Nepalese situation which neither the Rana government nor the Indian government could ignore. From New Delhi's point of view the Communist activity in Tibet in 1949-50 made Kathmandu's friendliness towards India as much necessary as internal reforms in Nepal desirable to prevent large scale disturbances in the country. India wanted no violent change in the established political structure at Kathmandu. Nehru made it clear :

> We have tried to find a way, middle way, if you like, which will ensure the progress of Nepal and the introduction of some advance in the ways of democracy in Nepal. We have searched for a way which would at the same time avoid the total uprooting of the ancient order.[75]

Nehru adopted the policy of friendly persuasion reinforced by timely admonitions to the Rana government. It was asked to undertake moderate political reforms to stave off the regime's total destruction by the forces of change within the country and without. Nehru declared :

> We have advised in earnestness the Government of Nepal, to the extent a friendly power can advise an independent nation, that in the inner context of Nepal, it is desirable to pay attention to the forces which are moving in the world, the democratic forces and forces of freedom, and put themselves in line with them.[76]

The Indian Ambassador to Kathmandu, C. P. N. Singh, kept up the pressure on Mohan Shamsher ; Nehru did so when the Nepalese Prime Minister visited New Delhi as a state guest in February 1950.

The Treaties of 1950

But all failed to yield the desired result ; and that mainly because of Mohan Shamsher's fond belief that in view of the Tibetan situation, India needed to keep on well with him. The belief was reinfored in July 1950 when a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded between the two countries whereby each undertook to regard the security problem of the other as of concern to itself and take precautionary measures to meet the problem.[77] Along with, a treaty of trade and commerce was also signed which was bitterly criticised in Nepal as harmful to its interests. Indeed, New Delhi's concern over the events in Tibet seemed to have given the Rana government a leeway to continue its old policy. As for New Delhi, it did from time to time press Mohan Shamsher to liberalise his rule, but the pressure was not hard enough.

The activity of the Nepali National Congress

New Delhi's policy caused considerable disappointment in the anti-Rana activists in India who had expected Nehru's government to back the progressive Nepali cause to the hilt. The Nepali National Congress thereupon resolved to launch an armed struggle in Nepal and in this it had the support of the Socialist Party. A prominent member of the party, Ram Manohar Lohia, warned the Government of India against doing anything the result of which would be

> to abort this ever widening and unbeatable revolt of the Nepali people against their usurpers. Ranas of Kathmandu are a weak tyranny, for they are not only usurpers but are also unable to exercise effective governmental or military power. Unsupported by India, their end is beyond doubt.[78]

The Nepali Congress sent a mission to Burma to obtain arms and ammunition from the Socialist government there[79] and a few daring members of the party to Kathmandu to assassinate

prominent members of the Rana family. The assassination plot was detected in time and the trial of the offenders that followed clearly established King Tribhuban's deep complicity in the anti-Rana movement. Subarna Shamsher in Calcutta had, in fact, maintained all the while contact with the King through trusted agents. The Nepali Congress had planned to carry off the King from Kathmandu to somewhere in western Nepal and set up there a parallel government under him. A number of disgruntled 'C' class Ranas at Kathmandu were involved in the conspiracy.[80]

The King's escape to India

On 6 November 1950, King Tribhuban and his family suddenly escaped from the royal palace and took refuge in the Indian Embassy. Four days later he was flown away to New Delhi in an Indian Air Force plane, the Rana opposition having been got over by New Delhi's pressure. Mohan Shamsher promptly declared the King deposed, but his plan of enthroning the four-year old grandson of the King, who had been left behind by the royal party, was foiled by New Delhi's firm stand behind the King in exile.[81]

Situation in Nepal

Meanwhile in Nepal the situation had been taking a bad turn for the Rana government ; the simmering discontent burst forth in acts of determined defiance of the government. The people of eastern Nepal, the Kirats, declared the establishment of an independent republic over an area of 6,000 square miles. Rudra Shamsher, the *Bada Hakim* of the Palpa district, rose with the local troops. A large number of 'C' class Ranas demanded the restoration of King Tribhuban to the throne and liberalisation of the administration. Similar demand was also made by several popular demonstrations in the Nepalese capital.[82]

Armed Struggle and New Delhi's intervention

With the king beyond the reach of the Ranas and the upsurge of popular feeling against them, the Nepali Congress decided to strike. Its volunteers, armed with the weapons obtained from Burma, stormed into Birganj, a town on the Indo-Nepalese border, and occupied it. At Biratnagar and Amlekhganj, two other border towns, bitter fighting raged between the Congress *Mukti Sena* (liberation army) and the Nepal Government troops.[83]

The armed struggle by the Nepali Congress called for decisive intervention by the Indian government. Fearing serious repercussions of the extreme step taken by the Nepali Congress and intervention of international powers in favour the Rana government, New Delhi adopted a policy having three facets : curbing the enthusiasm of the Nepali Congress for violent activity ; warning all foreign powers of India's special interests in Nepal ; and exerting more pressure on Kathmandu to accelerate political reforms. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Education Minister in Nehru's cabinet, pointed out :

> Although we cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal, we have to take cognizance of any discontent that arises there. Nepal is India's neighbour and any crisis there may endanger India's freedom. It is imperative, therefore, that the present Nepalese crisis should be resolved peacefully and without resort to arms.[84]

As for foreign interference in the Nepalese crisis, Nehru was firm. He clearly stated :

> Frankly, we do not like and shall not brook any foreign interference in Nepal. We recognise Nepal as an independent country and wish her well, but even a child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without passing through India. Therefore, no other country can have as intimate a relationship with Nepal as ours is. We

> would like every other country to appreciate the intimate geographical and cultural relationship that exists between India and Nepal.[85]

Meanwhile, the Chinese pressure on Tibet had intensified. Strong Chinese troops tore through eastern Tibet and soon entrenched themselves there. In western Tibet, too, the Chinese had stepped up their activities. With the Dalai Lama vainly appealing to the United Nations for intervention, Chinese troops reached Lhasa and 'liberated' the country. Nehru's Nepal policy bore his anxiety over the Tibetan situation ; political change in Nepal could no longer be delayed. Nehru was insistent and this was clear from his policy pronouncement in the Lok Sabha :

> Three years ago we assured Nepal of our desire that she should be a strong, independent and progressive country . . . . we pointed out in as friendly a way as possible that the world was changing rapidly ; if Nepal did not make an effort to keep pace with it, circumstances were bound to force her to do so.[86]

As for Indian interests in Nepal in the context of the developments in Tibet, Nehru continued :

> Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal has become still more acute and personal because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet. Besides our sympathetic interests in Nepal, we were also interested in the security of our own country. From time immemorial the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course they are no longer as impassable as they used to be, but are still fairly effective. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would also be a risk to our security.[87]

The End of the Rana regime

New Delhi wanted the Rana government to forthwith summon a Constituent Assembly as the first step to the formation of a government, consisting of both popular representatives and members of the Rana family. And then at last Mohan Shamsher caved in. He acquiesced in the demands for a popular political structure at Kathmandu. By a proclamation in January 1951 he promised to hold a general election and to form an interim cabinet with the Ranas and popular representatives as its members. And then, on King Tribhuban's appeal, the *Mukti Sena* stopped its military operations. In February King Tribhuban returned to Kathmandu to launch Nepal on a new career of democratic experimentations.[88] On 18 February a new government took office ; the rule of the Ranas had come to an end.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 6664/1939, 4862/1940.
2. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 4808/1939, Betham to Metcalfe, 12 July 1939.
3. Bhattacharjee, op. cit., pp, 24-5.
4. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 4631, 5895, 5896/1940.
5. Ibid. : Reg. Nos. 1632, 4862/1941.
6. Ibid. : Reg. No. 6986/1940.
7. Sukraraj Shastri, Ganga Lal, Dasarath Chand, Adibhakta and his son, Dharmabhakta, who was educated in India and on his return to Nepal in 1936 had been engaged in the royal palace as a physical training instructor. Ibid. : Reg. No. 1340/1941.
8. Ibid. ; Reg. No. 540/1941. Betham warned that such drastic punishment of the high caste men would land Yuddha Shamsher in trouble ; he said "the world of the 20th century simply will not stand for it" and that the Hindus in India who held the Nepalese Prime Minister in high regard will certainly resent his action. Ibid. : Reg. No. 1340/1941.
9. Ibid. ; Reg. No. 1632/1941 : also 1630/1941 : Betham to Caroe, 28 Jan., 7 Feb. 1941.

9a. Ibid.

10. Since 1856, the Rana Prime Ministers had borne the title Maharaja. see chapter 1, fn. 1.

11. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 1632/1941.

12. The Newars, "a culturally-dominant community" live in the central valley of Nepal where Kathmandu is situated. They were the rulers of the valley before the Gurkha rule was established there in 1767-68. G. S. Nepali, *The Newars* (Bombay, 1964).

13. The central valley with its three towns, Kathmandu, Patan and Bhatgaon, constituted the political and cultural hub of the country.

14. The earthquake took a toll of 700 lives. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 5089/1934. The exemption was made to commemorate the sixth anniversary of his rule. Ibid. : Reg. No. 6347/1938.

15. EC, 21-6 ; Reg. No. 1632/1941.

16. Ibid. : Reg. No. 289, 880/1941.

17. For one, not a Rana, colonelship was the highest rank attainable in the army and this too was rarely given. No civil department was headed by a non-Rana. No non-Rana could have an income of more than 1500 rupees per month. Regmi, op. cit., p. 26.

18. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 880/1941. Also No. 289/1941 : Viceroy to Secretary of State, Telg. 18 Jan. 1941. Francis Tuker, *Gurkha, The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal* (London, 1957), pp. 207-08.

    In the same year, a Subedar of a Gurkha regiment at Ludhiana was charged with having abused a British officer ; he was sent to Kathmandu where he was hanged. Regmi, op. cit., p. 157.

19. He was the first in the Rana family to have passed the Matriculation examination.

20. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 107 (2)/1928 : Wilkinson, Envoy, to Acheson, Offg. Foreign Secretary, 7 Dec. 1928.

20a. Ibid.

21. Ibid : Treatise on Nepal, by Keynes, 1928.

22. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 21/1928. When, in 1935, Yuddha Shamsher paid a visit to India as a state guest, prominent leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and several other political and social organisations wanted to call on him, but the Prime Minister did not oblige them. Asad Hussain, *British Relations with the kingdom of Nepal*, p. 215. Rahul Sankritayana, *Tibbat-men Sawa Varas*, P. 74. *The Modern Review*, Sept. 1939, pp. 249-50.

23. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No 21/1928 : Envoy's D. O. letter to Foreign Secretary, 18 Oct. 1928.

24. Ibid. Also IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 107(2)/1928 : Keynes' Treatise on Nepal.

25. He ruled for less than three years.

26. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 6664/1939. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 8124/1933, Who is Who in Nepal, 1933, p. 11. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 463/1933.
27. His predecessors had only British and Chinese titles.
28. IFP (Ext-Sec), File No. 463/1933.
29. Jang Bahadur had gone to England as a state guest in 1850 ; so had Chandra Shamsher in 1908. Rigid observance of caste rules by the Nepalese delegations caused the British authorities much inconvenience. V. Gabriel, the political Officer attached to Chandra Shamsher's party, found the journey "a very quaint proceeding". The Nepalese refused to take meals while on the train which they stopped frequently to get down to cook and eat food on the way side. The European hosts were, indeed, "much mystified" by their Nepalese guests taking "elaborate precautions" against contamination of European food. Gabriel to Curzon, 25 May 1909, CRP, Vol. 428.

    But these visits convinced the Ranas of the overwhelming power of the British government and of the risk of estranging it. The visits also widened the mental horizon of the Rana Prime Ministers as evidenced in the social reforms they undertook after the visits. P. J. B. Rana, *Life of Jang Bahadur*, op. cit., pp. 100-152. See my book, op. cit., p. 16.
30. The most virulent criticisms of the Rana regime were made in the *Janata* (Patna) and *Naya Hindustan* (Allahabad). *The Janata* charged Col. Daukes, the Envoy, with having taken bribe to help Yuddha Shamsher in his measures against the 'C' class Ranas in 1934. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 4808, 5448, 7036/1939. The Congress Socialist party members were associated with the paper. Ibid. ; Reg. No. 6191/1939.
31. In 1939, one Bhetnarain Shrestha, a Nepali graduate of the Calcutta university, gave private coaching to a Rana princess : he fell in love with her and married her. Bhetnarain wrote in the *Janata*, condemning the Rana regime. The Government refused to extradite him, holding the case to be one of elopement and not kidnapping, as alleged by Yuddha Shamsher. Yuddha Shamsher was very sore on this issue. Ranas had never married in the family of their subjects. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 4808, 6191/1939, 704/1940. Regmi, op. cit., p. 47.
32. Except the Regulation III of 1818 the Indian government had no means to suppress political propaganda or agitation in the Indian territory against a foreign government. However, the Indian government did not want to use the Regulation too frequently to repress "journalistic scurrility" and thereby provoke adverse com-

ments in the Indian press and legislatures. PEF, 3085/1912, Pt. 2 : Reg. No. 2516, Government to Envoy, 11 June 1923.

33. IFP (Ext-B), June 1908, Nos. 118-25.
34. EC, 21-6 : Reg. Nos. 4384, 6664/1939, 264/1941 : Betham to Government, 28 Nov. 1940.
35. Ibid. Reg. Nos. 6664/1939, 1632/1941.
36. Kennion, "England and Nepal", op. cit., pp. 53-54.
37. EC, 21-6 ; Reg. No. 6664/1939, Betham to Caroe.
38. Ibid. : Reg. Nos. 4384/1939, 4862/1940,
39. Geoffrey Betham, "Nepal", *JRCAS*, Jan. 1948, Pt. I, p. 20. Dashwood Strettell, "The Indian Army Before and After 1947", Ibid. April 1948, Pt. II, pp. 119-20.
40. C. G. Bruce, "India's Frontier Problem", *Asiatic Review*, April 1939, p. 514.
41. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 4862/1940,
42. Betham saw Padm Shamsher "not particularly anxious to become Maharaja and it is quite within the bounds of possibility that he will step aside and allow Sir Mohan Shamsher to assume the office". Ibid, : Reg. No. 6664/1939, Betham to Caroe, 17 Aug. 1939. Sometime later Betham reported "should Sir Padma become Prime Minister, the power will pass into the Chandra family. They will then rule with Sir Padma as the nominal head of the state." EC. 21-6 : Reg. No. 4862/1940, Betham to Halifax, 27 July 1940. F. M. Bailey, an earlier Envoy, had held the same view. EC, 21-51 : Reg. No. 861/1937 Bailey to A. Eden, 15 Jan. 1937.
43. EC, 21-18 : Reg. No. 2765/1934 : Envoy to Government, 25 Mar. 1934.
44. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 4862/1940, Betham to Halifax, 27 July 1940.
45. EC, 21-12 : Reg. No. 2677/1943 : Linlithgow to L. S. Amery, Secretary of State, 24 May 1943. Also, Reg. No. 4676/1939, same to Marquis of Zetland, 17 Aug. 1939.
46. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 1699/1941.
47. In the Biratnagar jute mill. half the capital invested was supplied by Yuddha Shamsher and his close relatives. IFP, (Ext-Sec), File No. 291/1936.
48. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 5240/1941, Viceroy to Secretary of State, Telg. 26 Aug. 1941.

48a. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 1632/1941 ; EC, 21-51 : Reg. No. 1690/1938, Report on Nepal for 1937.

49. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 1699/1941, Telg. from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 8 May 1941.
50. Ibid. : Reg Nos. 3099, 3622/1940. 2479/1941 ; 21-18 : Reg. No. 4120/1942.

51. In 1936 the official rate of exchange was 100 Indian rupees = 124 Nepali rupees ; a few years later, it was 100 Indian rupees = 135 Nepali rupees ; by 1945, the rate had fallen to 62 Nepali rupees = 100 Indian rupees. Not until 1945 did Nepal have currency notes. EC, 21-5 : Who is Who in Nepal, 1949. EC, 21-51 : Reg. No. 861/1937.
52. EC, 21-6 : Reg. No. 3622/1940.
53. Ibid. : Reg. No, 1699/1941, Dept. Notes, 27 Apr. 1941.
54. The papers also criticised the British government for having propped up the regime. Ibid., Reg. No. 1040/1941.
54a. HPP (Int), File No. 1020/1943.
55. EC, 21-6 ; Reg. Nos. 4808, 5448, 6191, 7036/1939, 640 6694, 6986/1940.
56. On 8 August 1942, the Congress decided to launch a mass struggle to forestall which the Government arrested all the prominent leaders. This led to violent riots and destruction of government property on a large scale. More than 60,000 people were arrested by the Government. Several Nepali youngmen such as B. P. Koirala, D. R. Regmi, S. P. Upadhyay and H. P. Pradhan, who played important part in Nepal's political life in later years, were arrested by the Indian government for having participated in the movement. R. S. Chauhan, *The Political Development in Nepal, 1950-70* (New Delhi, 1971), p. 23.
56a. EC, 21-10 : Reg. No. 6480/1941.
57. EC, 21-12 : Reg. No. 2677/1943.
57a. HPP (Int), File No. 3-39/1942,
58. Asad Hussain, op. cit., p. 226.
59. Anirudha Gupta, *Politics in Nepal* (New Delhi, 1964), p. 29.
60. EC, 21-12 : Reg. No. 2677/1943.
61. Ibid., Dept. Note.
62. Ibid. : Reg. No. 1318/1944, Extract from Annual Report on Nepal for 1943.
63. Leo E. Rose, *Nepal : Strategy for Survival* (Bombay, 1971), pp, 178.80. S. D. Muni, *Foreign Policy of Nepal* (Delhi, 1973), pp. 13-32,
64. He was the son of Hiranya Shamsher, an illegitimate son of Bhim Shamsher. An M. A. of the Calcutta university he held the posts of the Deputy Director of Nepal's Development Board and the Governor of Birganj, before he came down to India to organise the anti-Rana movement. Bhola Chatterji, *A Study of Recent Nepalese Politics* (Calcutta, 1967), p. 38.
65. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, a member of Nehru's cabinet, supported the activities. Ibid., p. 65 fn.

66. He became the Prime Minister of Nepal in May 1959 ; he was ousted from power in December 1960 when the King, Mahendra Vir Vikram Shah Deb, took personal control of the administration, bringing the parliamentary government to an abrupt end. Chauhan, op. cit., pp. 109-62. Gupta, op. cit., pp. 148-62.
67. Ibid,, pp. 29-30. Chauhan, op. cit., 24-25. Bhattacharjee, op. cit., p. 28.
68. Gupta, op. cit., p. 31,
69. Rose, op. cit., p. 181.
70. Muni, op. cit., p. 17-19.
71. Ibid., p. 15.
72. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 16-17
73. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
74. Rose, op. cit., p. 182.
75. Quoted in Muni, op. cit., p. 27.
76. Quoted in Rose, op. cit., p. 185.
77. Ibid., p. 186,
78. Quoted in Muni, op. cit., p. 28.
79. Bhola Chatterjee was in charge of the mission. See his book *A Study of Recent Nepalese Politics* (Calcutta, 1967).
80. Chauhan, op. cit., P. 32.
81. Rose. op. cit., p. 191.
82. Chauhan, op. cit., p, 32.
83. For details see Chatterji, op. cit., pp, 94 et seq.
84. Quoted in Muni, op. cit., p. 31.
85. Ibid., p. 29.
86. Ibid., p. 13.
87. Ibid., 13-14.
88. Chatterji, op. cit., pp. 138-47. Chauhan, op. cit., pp. 32-36. Gupta, op. cit., pp, 45-48.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the Indian nationalist movement on Nepal was neither as immediate nor as intense as it could have been, considering the contiguity of the two countries, their historical relations spanning several centuries and the long duration of the movement. In fact, it is only in the last years of the movement that its influence on the course of Nepalese politics proved decisive.

That this was so was mainly on account of the fact that the basis of the relations of the two countries was kept deliberately narrow by the rulers who did not allow the movement to affect the basis in any way. The rulers of Nepal, the Ranas, prevented the relations of their state with India from developing beyond the governmental level ; and their hold over the government never loosened except during the last years of their rule.

Under the Rana system of government any internal generation of the ideas of modernity and change was impossible ; and as for exposure of the local people to such ideas elsewhere, it was prevented by the rigid implementation of the country's traditional policy of isolation and non-intercourse with foreigners. No doubt, political security was achieved by this policy but at the cost of social and economic development of the country.

But then, such a policy would have hardly succeeded without the British encouragement of it. British interests in Nepal were best served by the strong oligarchic Rana regime, and naturally they would prevent any debilitating influence on the regime caused by external forces. The isolationist policy of Kathmandu was a guarantee of Britain's exclusive position in Nepal at a time when the international situation made the maintenance of such a position increasingly difficult. Ambitions of Japan and Soviet Russia, for instance, had already affected British relations with Afghanistan, Persia, Tibet and China. Indeed, the Rana-British alliance was based on their

acceptance of the fact that their limited interests could best be promoted by the prevention of any growth of multi-dimensional relations between the peoples of India and Nepal.

That such growth was not possible seems to have been accepted by the Indian nationalists, too ; hence, their desistance from any organised and sustained effort to involve the people of Nepal in the anti-British movement in India. It was obvious to them that the insularity of the country, strength of the autocratic Rana regime, the support it received from the powerful British government and the very low level of political awareness in the Nepalese people would render any such effort futile.

Instead, therefore, the Indian nationalists confined their activity to attempts at undermining the two main planks of the relations between the governments of Nepal and British India : the Rana confidence in the British government's deference to Nepal's independence and integrity ; and the loyalty of Nepal's martial tribesmen to the British government. Mahendra Pratap and other revolutionaries sought to excite the Rana government's fear that British alliance might result in British domination. Alongside, the revolutionaries would also excite another latent spirit in the Nepalese government : ambition of territorial expansion a spirit held in leash by the British. Both the spirits-fear of the British and ambition for acquisition of territory—had a strong traditional basis which political changes in the country had scarcely affected.

However, the revolutionaries failed in their attempts. The Ranas were fearful of the British no doubt, but the fear was balanced by their pragmatism—their conviction that as long as the practical independence of Nepal was guaranteed by the British government and the state was not treated as just an Indian feudatory state, alliance with the British was worthwhile as a source of strength. In fact, for the Ranas, the risk of the loss of British friendship far outweighed the dubious prospects of gain by the espousal of the cause of the Indian nationalists.

The loyalty of the military tribesmen of Nepal was, indeed, a strong buttress of the Rana regime--internally. And as for the British, it was for the Gurkhas that they valued the Rana government as their "blood ally". Naturally, both the governments were most sensitive to any threat to this main basis of the Indo-Nepalese governmental relations. Between them the Rana and the British governments had adopted such a policy of recruitment of Gurkhas as to ensure their complete control on the martial population of Nepal. The economic dependence of the men on the Indian government served as the most effective deterrent to the spread of any anti-British feelings in them ; and the sponsorship of the Rana government being made essential for recruitment, the growth of anti-Rana feelings in the tribesmen was scarcely possible. The Gurkhas' innate sense of separateness from the Indians was carefully fostered by both the Rana and British governments ; and by successfully co-ordinating their respective policies, they foiled the Indian nationalists' attempts to involve the Gurkhas in the anti-British movement.

This feeling of identity and separateness was also seen in the Indian-born Gurkhas and Gurkhas domiciled in India, who could but have little influence on the course of the nationalist movement in India. Their political awareness grew no doubt, but that did not seem to have influenced the traditional character of their social structure ; their continued connexion with Nepal in many forms reinforced that structure, apart from enabling the Ranas to retain their social control on the men.

Most of the Nepali associations in India until the late thirties had little political impact on Nepal and its people. Their objects were rather to promote the interests of the Nepalese domiciled in India than launch a political movement in Nepal. Even the All India Gurkha League, the most important of the associations, took rather an ambivalent attitude towards the Rana regime and its relations with the British government. The League criticised the Rana government for having caused stagnancy in the Nepalese economic and social life, but took

no step to make the people of Nepal aware of it far less to encourage them to change the state of affairs. It disavowed support for agitational politics and chose instead to further its objects by enlisting the support of the British government. May be, the large number of Gurkha pensioners in the organisation obliged it to avoid a radical posture. It is significant that Thakur Chandan Singh had but a brief association with the Indian National Congress which he did not hope to champion the cause of the Nepalese in India. This some prominent leaders of the Congress were no doubt inclined to do during the Civil Disobedience Movement with a view to enlisting the support of the Gurkhas in India, but there does not seem to have been any understanding with the Gurkha League in this regard. Chandan Singh was later won over by Chandra Shamsher.[1]

In such circumstances, the political consciousness of the Gurkhas in India could have little influence on the political situation in Nepal. Such influence had to await the emergence of a Nepali educated elite, the natural instrument of change. Under the Rana system this emergence was difficult for it permitted neither the development of education within the country nor encouraged the acquisition of knowledge from without. The small number of enlightened men, products of the few educational institutions in Nepal, were either absorbed in government service and attached to the establishment or driven out of the country, being held suspicious.

Consequently, the elements of change to grow had to have a base outside Nepal. India provided the base where the Nepalese political consciousness found its early manifestation ; and in the movements in India the emerging Nepalese elite received their early training in political activities. It is this elite which fanned the anti-Rana feelings into a political force and gave it both dimension and direction. They were involved in the agitational politics in India their object being political change in Nepal and not merely the promotion of the interests of the Nepalis domiciled in India. This Nepali elite

forged the link between the anti-Rana agitation and anti-British movement. They made common cause with the Indian nationalists and enlisted their sympathy and support for their own cause. Until the last years of the Rana rule the leaders of the anti-Rana agitation operated far more effectively in India and the Nepalese territory in immediate vicinity of India than anywhere deeper inside Nepal.

The Indian nationalist movement provided a test to the Rana-British alliance. Generally speaking, the arrangements made by the two governments to meet the threat posed by the movement stood them in god stead. There were, of course, occasional rift in the lute caused by misunderstanding. New Delhi disliked, for example, the Rana craving for concessions as Nepal's traditional policy of blackmail while New Delhi's refusal to extradite political offenders who viewed by the Rana government as the persistence of the traditional British policy of using Nepali political refugees as a lever to gain influence on the Nepalese *darbar*.[2]

However, both the governments took care not to drive the matters to an issue. The Rana propensity to take advantage of the British troubles was tempered by their dependence on the British to deal with the India-based anti-Rana activities. As for the British, the growth of the Indian unrest obliged them to take an increasingly indulgent attitude to the Rana demands for concessions. The fear was that an unfriendly Nepal could throw out of gear the Indian military organisation in which there was a high proportion of Gurkhas.

That the anti-Rana activists operated in India as their base was a commentary on the British government's policy itself; so at any rate the Rana felt—the British policy seemed to them not strong enough. The Ranas grudged New Delhi's not adopting stringent measures to curb the activities of the anti-Rana elements in India. Besides, the expansion of education, the freedom of speech, association and communication and the progressive liberalisation of the Indian administration were from the Rana point of view portentious developments. Not

unnaturally was Chandra Shamsher worried. The British Envoy himself bore this out :

> Though Maharaja [Chandra Shamsher] is too polite, he does not say, but really does not have a very high opinion of British policy in India. He says we have given Indians education too quickly and we have been weak.[3]

The Prime Minister was certain that all this would have an inevitable impact on the Nepalese mind in as much as it would make the contrast between the Rana and the British administration starker ; it would open up the eyes of the Nepalese and strengthen their feelings against the Rana regime. All this was certain to damage the existing relationship between the two governments.

Several British officers, too, shared the Rana anxiety on this score. British interests necessitated the maintenance of the status quo, Nepal a closed land for all but those sponsored by the British government and the Nepalese mind kept clear from all extraneous influences. Thus, Colonel F. W. P. Macdonald, Resident at Kathmandu in 1908-09, held :

> As a matter of fact, the people of Nepal are happy, contented and uncommonly well off ; and it will be a thousand pities if Indian 'Civilisation' and its accompaniments in the shape of education, forward movement and sedition were to penetrate into Nepal—the longer it is kept back, the better.[4]

R. L. Kennion, who represented the Indian government at Kathmandu in 1920-21, held the same view. The Rana regime as it was under Chandra Shamsher seemed to him "perhaps of all forms of government the sanest" ; to him democratic institutions were no determinants of progress and development of a country.[5] He was worried over the future of British relations with Nepal, should Britain commit "the crime of offering to India the poisoned cloak of complete independence and India were mad enough to accept it".[6]

Kennion warned New Delhi that British interests in Nepal would not suffer at all if Nepal did not keep pace with the changing times ; rather,

> the danger is that false ideas about progress should penetrate across the frontier from India to the detriment of this brave, docile and attractive people.[7]

General Bruce with his intimate knowledge of Nepal, its institutions and people was of the same opinion. True, Bruce admitted, the Ranas had kept Nepal in an extremely backward state and that the British policy of non-interference with the Rana administration was, indeed, an anomaly when viewed in the context of the changing British policy in India and the developments in the world at large. But then, he pointed out, British interests in Nepal demanded the maintenance of the existing state of affairs. Bruce elaborated :

> It really would be a terrible disaster to find the one country in the world which entirely lives its own life modernised and vulgarised. At the same time it is an anomaly and the only possible method of keeping it in its present excessively interesting though anomalous condition is to continue the policy so long established.[8]

Even the Rana policy of restricting education to a few was good in the interests of the British government for, "in consequence, Nepal is free from the curse of a plethora of half-educated and unemployed Babuș", the vehicle of politiical discontent.

However, the force of circumstances ultimately proved too strong for both the Rana and British governments. Nepal did change, though very slowly. The development of self-government in India served as a glaring contrast to the autocratic Rana regime ; and the sharper the contrast grew, the more intense became the feeling against the regime. The Ranas were forced to be on the defensive.

The British position was no better either. With the years, the dichotomy in British policy became obvious : the Indian

administration was being increasingly liberalised, while an autocratic foreign government continued to be supported on the specious plea that such support was essential in the interests of the Indian administration itself. British influence on the Rana family was too patent for the Nepalese elite to be taken in by the British assertion that their non-interventionist policy towards the internal affairs of Nepal stemmed from their deference to the independence of the country. The Rana-British relationship appeared to the Nepalese elite as an unholy alliance, a partnership in the project of exploiting the people of Nepal. The link between the anti-British and anti-Rana movements was naturally strengthened ; the overthrow of the British government in India was, indeed, imperative for effecting the fall of the Rana regime.

The Ranas had to blame themselves for having increased their regime's vulnerability to hostile elements. The House of the Ranas was hopelessly divided and the periodical purging of disgruntled family members reinforced the India-based anti-Rana forces. The masterful personality of Chandra Shamsher had kept in check the centrifugal tendencies in the Rana family ; with his death, the tendencies could not be curbed effectively. British alliance had no doubt strenghened the Rana regime but even this alliance proved of no avail when the internal strength of the regime was sapped by familial dissensions. Corroded from within, and progressively weakened, the regime could not meet the challenge of the times.

The impact of the Indian nationalist movement on Nepal seems to have been purely political and for long limited to a small educated elite operating at Kathmandu and in Nepalese towns on the Indian border. The message of the movement hardly reached the masses who were scarcely involved in it. And since the impact was limited, it could be easily controlled by the authorities. As for the anti-Rana movement, it succeeded less because of the failure of the Rana government to meet the challenge, than because of the change in the policy of the Indian government towards the Rana regime. In the context

of the changing international scene and its own manifold problems, the newly-independent government of India realised the importance of Nepal's friendliness from the political and military points of view, but it wanted the broadening of the base of the relationship of the two countries to make it stronger ; the relationship was to be built by the two peoples and not by the loyalty and co-operation of a family, however powerful. Hence, New Delhi's pressure on the Rana government to widen its power base ; hence, its insistence on popular participation in the decision making process of the government. In fact, both the magnitude and intensity of the anti-Rana movement after the British withdrawal from India and its rapid success would emphasise the fact that the change in the attitude of the Indian government towards the Rana regime had much to do with its rather sudden collapse.

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1. Bhattacharjee, op.cit., p. 51.
2. For example, in 1801-04 Lord Wellesley sought to make political use of the exiled Nepalese King, Ran Bahadur Shah. The party in power at Kathmandu made a treaty with the Company to deter the latter from supporting the exiled King's bid for the recovery of power. The treaty (1801) provided for the posting of a British Resident at Kathmandu, through whom the Calcutta government hoped to further its political and commercial designs in Nepal. Again, in 1846, when Jang Bahadur expelled the King Rajendra Vikram, his queen and their followers, the newly-established Rana government feared the British making use of his enemies in India. Yet again, in 1885, when Bir Shamsher seized power by a *coup*, a large number of his cousins (sons of Jang Bahadur whose claims of succession were stronger than Bir's) fled to India for their life. For long the new regime at Kathmandu was worried lest the British government made political use of the Ranas in India. In fact, the accommodating attitude which Bir Shamsher took towards the Indian government could be explained by his fear of Calcutta

supporting the cause of the Rana political emigres. see my book, *Political Relations*, op. cit., pp. 8, 40, 56.

3. F. O. 766/1 : Envoy's Diary, 7 May 1925.
4. F. O. 766/13 : Macdonald to H. V. Cobb, Officiating Secretary, Foreign Dept., 9 March 1909.
5. R. L. Kennion, "England and Nepal", *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Jan. 1922, pp. 53-4.
6. Kennion, "Recollections of Nepal", *Blackwood's Magazine*, May 1931, pp. 665-78.
7. Ibid., pp. 675-77.
8. Bruce, *Himalayan Wanderer*, op. cit., p. 186.

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